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1 Introduction 
 
Within the few last years the European aviation market has developed and changed 
significantly. Growing globalisation has connected the markets more and more to each 
other, but also the growing population has led to an increased demand in flight travel.1 
Conditions in the aviation market have changed within the last twenty years also. The 
aviation sector has already been global for approximately sixty years, but less regulated 
markets have been realised, especially within the last twenty years.2 
At the beginning of the 1980s many European countries liberalised their airline markets. 
However, since 1988, the EU have relaxed the trading rules and the European airline 
market has moved to a position that permits airlines to be almost free from economic 
regulation. In the 1990s a Single European Market was created which meant that the 
European international air transportation was significantly deregulated. In 1997 full 
cabotage within the European member countries was permitted.3 
Before the deregulation (USA 1978) and liberalisation (Europe 1997) of the aviation 
market, the following three types of airlines existed: 
 Full-Service Carrier (FSC) or Network Carrier or Legacy Airlines (e.g. Lufthansa) 
 Charter Airlines (e.g. Condor) 
 Regional Airlines (e.g. FLYBE) 
The exact definition of the above types of airlines will be explained in detail in chapter two. 
After the deregulation and liberalisation of the aviation market, the so called  
“Low Cost Carrier” business model was created. With the full implementation of the 
liberalisation in Europe (in three steps) between 1993 and 1997, low cost  
carriers like Ryanair, EasyJet, and others have been founded. Until the year 1998 the 
number of the airlines in Europe has increased from 132 to 164.4   
 
A detailed definition of the low cost carriers will also be given in chapter two. 
Nowadays the low cost carriers are strong competitors of traditional airlines – particularly 
within the European flight routes. Traditional airlines are constantly reducing their costs in 
order to ensure their competitiveness, and in some cases the traditional airlines are 
creating their own low cost carriers, for example Lufthansa with Germanwings or 
Iberia/British Airways with Vueling and Iberia Express. Due to the strong competition in 
Europe it is a fact that traditional airlines now find it difficult to profit to these destinations. 
The traditional airlines now have to do a cross-subsidisation for such competitive 
European destinations. This means the profits the traditional airlines gain out of business 
and first class seats on long-haul flights “subsidise” the point-to-point flights within 
Europe.5    
                                                          
1
 Source: own words M. Widmann, 24.07.2015 
2
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, p.426 
3
 ref. Button, Wings Across Europe, 2004, p.25 
4
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.427-429 
5
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.430-431 
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In case of this fact the following question arises: To what extend does the business 
models of the traditional airlines compete with the “new” market participants of the low 
cost carriers and what further effects will this have on the whole European aviation 
market? Relating to this, the current competitive position and the continuous changes are 
of high interest, and in this Master Thesis I will do a competitive position analysis of 
traditional airlines and low cost carriers based on the theoretical competitive strategies. 
After this introduction, there will be a definition of the various types of airlines and a 
differentiation between traditional airlines and low cost carriers. Subsequently, a 
competitor analysis between these two airline business models (traditional and low cost) 
will take place in chapter three. Here the aspects market shares, fleet, price and cost 
comparisons and safety will be investigated in greater detail. 
In chapter four I will give explanations to the general competitor strategies, to reach 
competitive advantages based on M. E.Porter’s theory, and the so called “outpacing 
strategy” based on Gilbert/Strebel. 
The fifth part of the work contains the real use of competitor strategies, with an in depth 
look at Lufthansa and Vueling. Firstly this will contain detailed information on Lufthansa, 
which represents the traditional airlines. I will show which strategies this airline is following 
in general, and also due to the low cost competition. I will use Vueling to represent the low 
cost carriers, and I will give an overview from its creation up until today. For both airlines 
an exact investigation/conclusion regarding their strategy (e.g. cost- vs. quality leadership) 
is included later. To back up my research, I have done so called “expert interviews” with 
representatives from Lufthansa and Vueling. The detailed results of the interviews you will 
find in chapter five also.  
Air Berlin is also mentioned as a further example. 
In order to gain further feedback about the current situation in the aviation sector, I have 
also included expert interviews with Swissport and Groundforce who are the handling 
companies and directly affected stakeholders. 
To gain a better insight of this subject, I have also included results from my own 
questionnaire which actual passengers took part in. The detailed results and a summary 
of this questionnaire show how customers see and evaluate the traditional airlines and the 
low cost carriers, and include customer points of view. 
In the conclusion (chapter 6) I will do an overall summary of my Master Thesis. This 
summary contains the trends and outlook, my own possible recommendations, and 
closing words regarding the future development of the European airline business – 
especially concerning traditional airlines and low cost carriers. The conclusion is based on 
the theoretical and practical competitive strategies and on the surveys and expert 
interviews.  
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2 Aviation market and airlines 
 
The international aviation market presents itself today as an oligopoly (based on offer). 
The cartel of IATA (International Air Transport Association) has lost its price influencing 
function since the US American and European deregulation. Scheduled air transport is 
internationally segmented in various geographical differentiated part markets (Europe, 
North Atlantic, Middle East, Far East, South America, etc.).6  
The main focus of this work will look in depth at the full-service and low cost carriers 
based in Europe. All these airlines are scheduled air traffic. The regional airlines (also 
scheduled airlines) and charter airlines (non-scheduled air traffic) are mentioned in order 
to ensure the completeness of all types of airlines but are not the focus of the work. 
Based on the business models and network strategies, airlines can be classified in four 
categories: 
 Full-Service Carrier (FSC) or Network Carrier (traditional airlines = scheduled air 
traffic) 
 Charter Airline (traditional airlines/holiday airlines = non-scheduled air traffic) 
 Regional Airline (traditional airlines = scheduled air traffic) 
 Low Cost Carrier (= scheduled air traffic)7 
 
2.1 Definition of traditional airlines 
 
Before the liberalisation of the European aviation market the traditional airlines have been 
differentiated between scheduled and charter traffic. Since the creation of low cost carriers 
and a change in the charter airlines, this distinction is no longer enough. Low cost carriers 
can now be counted to include the scheduled airlines also. In the following, the different 
airline types will be defined, and also the originally distinction between scheduled and 
non-scheduled air traffic explained.8 
 
2.1.1 Full-Service carrier (scheduled airlines) 
 
Characteristic of full-service carrier/network carrier (scheduled air traffic) 
Each flight between defined flight destinations, executed in regular periods for public use, 
with tariff duty, transportation duty and flight plan duty is generally defined as scheduled 
air traffic. E.g. within the “Luftverkehrsgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” the 
scheduled air transport is defined by the following mentioned characteristics: 
                                                          
6
 ref. Aberle, Transportwirtschaft, 2009, p.61 
7
 ref. Rürup and Reichart, Determinanten der Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit im internationalen 
  Luftverkehr, March 2014, p.17 
8
 ref. Diesfeld, Strategieoptionen fuer den Ausbau Strategischer Allianzen, 2004, p.443 
  Page: 9/118
  
Commercial nature: Scheduled air traffic used for the transportation of goods and people 
for which a charge is made. 
Publicity: The scheduled air service has to be offered to the general public. 
Regularity: The arrival and departure times for periodical flight connections are defined in 
a previous published flight plan.  
Line bonding: It is mandatory to the airline to operate the air service (flight) based on a 
predefined route between departure, stopover and destination points. 
Operating duty: Based on §21, paragraph 2 “LuftVG” the scheduled airlines have the duty 
to perpetuate the service for the duration of authorization. 
Transportation duty: The public availability of the scheduled air service is underlined by 
the transportation duty. 
Tariff duty: The transportation conditions and flight prices will be valid by the confirmation 
of the “Bundesminister fuer Verkehr”.9  
Before the beginning of the 1990s, Deutsche Lufthansa (LH) was a monopolist in regards 
to flights within Germany. And since the appearance of smaller airlines, it has also 
become part monopolist. A significant amount of these smaller airlines are flying for 
Lufthansa in the meanwhile, and in some cases also with LH flight numbers. Since the 
liberalisation of the European aviation market, the market structure has changed to an 
oligopoly (based on offer). Airlines from other European countries are 
connecting/operating international flights using German airports, and are also offering 
flights within Germany (cabotage traffic; clearance since April 1997).10 
Full-service carrier / network carrier are operating a wide national and international route 
network (hub-and-spoke principle). The main elements of this concept are the home 
airports – the so called “hubs”. Airports with a hub accommodate flights from other 
national and intercontinental airports (spokes), they are then bundled and afterwards 
redistributed to the intercontinental connecting flights. The focus on a central air traffic 
intersection (hub) enables the operation of a wide flight network. During the flight (air 
transportation), the scheduled airlines are offering further services (mostly free of charge) 
such as onboard catering, entertainment system, along with seat reservations, etc. This 
business model also offers cargo and freight, alongside passengers.11 
Due to the fact that the European full-service carrier provide a range of various services, 
such as business/leisure, domestic/intra-Europe/Intercontinental, etc. they operate a 
mixed fleet of aircraft types. They are mainly gaining sales with the business market 
because they have their hubs in the main commercial centers and they offer frequent 
services also with strategic alliances (see chapter no. 2.3).12 
Nevertheless, there has been a decrease in the selling of business class fares, especially 
in the shorter haul markets, due to the passenger mix carried. This long-term trend has 
contributed to the financial problems that traditional airlines are also having with the short-
                                                          
9
  ref. Diesfeld, Strategieoptionen fuer den Ausbau Strategischer Allianzen, 2004, pp.362-363 
10
 ref. Aberle, Transportwirtschaft, 2009, p.61 
11
 ref. Rürup and Reichart, Determinanten der Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit im internationalen 
    Luftverkehr, March 2014, p.17 
12
 ref. Button, Wings Across Europe, 2004, p.52 
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haul market, for example competition by low cost carrier within Europe. This fact, and 
recent events like economic crisis have forced the full-service carriers to restructure their 
activities and adjust their strategies. Also a common strategy among the large airlines has 
been the intensification of global strategic alliances. The full-service carriers have also 
confronted the low cost carriers (no-frills carrier) by modifying the structure of flight prices 
with the intra-European destinations. For example they have realised this, and now offer a 
greater number of cheaper seats with less service, and also in some cases they have 
established their own low cost carriers like Lufthansa with Germanwings.13 
 
2.1.2 Charter airlines (non-scheduled airlines) 
 
Characteristic of charter airlines (non-scheduled air traffic) 
Concerning the definition of non-scheduled traffic which in the literature is often threaten 
synonymous with non-scheduled flight service, order traffic or charter traffic, a unique 
definition does not exist. For this reason the differentiation in regard to the scheduled air 
traffic based on the “Luftverkehrsgesetz Deutschland” and the Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation is as a solid possibility concerning the definition. In both legal 
guidelines the non-scheduled traffic is defined as commercial air transportation, which 
cannot be assigned to the scheduled air transportation. However, based on a discussion 
regarding non-scheduled air transportation and its traffic streams, it can be observed that 
this description does not reflect the current international aviation traffic in a real way. The 
regularity of which main flight destinations are operated by so called charter airlines during 
a longer period (e.g. year), and the number of passengers transported, shows that this 
kind of flights are not only occasional ones. Rather it can be seen a convergence 
tendency to existing scheduled routes. 
Fundamental characteristics of traditional charter flights are: partial or complete sales of 
seat capacity to institutions like tour operators, companies who are selling the 
transportation service either isolated or within a product package to end customers (flight 
passengers).  
Compared to the scheduled air traffic, charter traffic has regularly less cabin comfort as 
well as less flexibility (less flight frequencies, less convenient flight schedules and less 
favourable booking and rebooking conditions). Furthermore the price level of the charter 
airlines is often below the tariffs of the scheduled airlines. Charter airlines are also not 
allowed to transport air freight on the lower deck within passenger flights. This means that 
they are not able to realise economies of scope. Nevertheless, charter airlines have a cost 
advantage against scheduled air traffic airlines, as their expenses on computer booking 
systems, administration, sales and marketing are relatively low due to the charter/sales of 
the complete flight to tour operators.  
It can be said that despite the mentioned differences, there has been a convergence 
tendency of the service offer of scheduled airlines and charter airlines within the European 
aviation market. Due to the increase in the demand for more individual flights, the demand 
for package tours has been decreasing and charter flights are therefore also sold isolated 
                                                          
13
 ref. Button, Wings Across Europe, 2004, pp.54-55 
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from the tour operator side. In this regard it can be mentioned that based on the 
increasing special and group tariffs of the scheduled airlines, and since the foundation of 
low cost carriers, it has been realised a convergence of the flight prices between the 
scheduled and charter air traffic. Furthermore, charter airlines can easily reach the status 
of a scheduled carrier since the liberalisation of the European aviation market. The 
amount of transportation classes is also not a differentiation characteristic anymore, as 
charter airlines are also offering further classes other than just economy, which decreases 
the gap with the scheduled airlines as well. 
Nevertheless, the convergence fact between charter airlines and scheduled airlines does 
not mean that a differentiation within the aviation market is of no need anymore. It can be 
assumed that the airlines will focus further on different target groups by an individual 
strategy of their flight offers.14 
 
2.1.3 Regional airlines (scheduled airlines) 
 
Characteristic of regional airlines (scheduled air traffic) 
In Europe, in addition to the low cost carriers, there also exist a number of airlines called 
“Regional Airlines”. Often, these airlines are also offering no-frills services. The regional, 
geographical limited coverage means that although in case these airlines offer an 
excellent onboard service, that they do not operate to the number of destinations and 
service categories like the full-service airlines. 
“The regional airlines serve a variety of functions at the local level and on many thinner 
routes – e.g., smaller short-haul markets and providing feed to larger carriers. They may 
be seen as complementary to the full-service airlines they are often linked to and for which 
they often provide feed.”15 
In the Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (ICAO) this type of airline is 
defined as follows: 
„A regional carrier provides short-haul scheduled passenger and freight services, 
operating mostly turboprop and/or small jet aircraft and connecting small and medium-
sized communities with major cities and hubs.”16 
“A regional air service, i.e. either an air service offered on routes serving smaller cities 
within a region or between regions of a State; or an air service offered on secondary 
routes serving smaller cities in a regional area involving the territories of more than one 
State.”17 
 
 
                                                          
14
 ref. Diesfeld, Strategieoptionen fuer den Ausbau Strategischer Allianzen, 2004, pp.363-366 
15
 ref. Button, Wings Across Europe, 2004, p. 64 
16
 ref. ICAO, Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, 2004, C.5.1-2  
17
 ref. ICAO, Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, 2004, C.5.3-1 
  Page: 12/118
  
2.2 History and definition of low cost carriers (scheduled airlines) 
 
The history: 
Originating in the United States this business model began to emerge with Southwest 
Airlines in 1971.18  
Southwest Airline was the first “No Frills” airline. They did not offer additional services 
such as free of charge food or newspapers, etc. but the flight prices were significant lower 
compared to the established airlines. However, this business model was really established 
successfully after the deregulation of the North American aviation market in October 1978. 
In 2004 Southwest had 417 aircrafts and were the third biggest airline in the USA. In 2013 
the number of aircrafts reached 680, and the flights were operating to 96 destinations in 
41 countries. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this work, since the liberalisation of the European 
aviation market (since the middle of the 1990s) the low cost carrier emerged as a new 
business model. From that time, the aviation market has also changed in Europe. 
Traditional airlines like full-service airlines and charter airlines could hardly see 
competition by these “new” airlines, as the market share of the low cost carriers was 
relatively low at the beginning. But the low cost carriers have developed a problem for the 
traditional airlines, especially in Europe. The scheduled airlines and charter airlines have 
lost significantly market share within the last few years, but it was the charter airlines even 
“suffered” the most from the low cost carriers (see also chapter 3).19 
The deregulation and liberalisation have led to more competition and to a glut in the 
market, and due to that reason the ticket prices have decreased dramatically, especially 
on flight routes which also are operated by low cost carriers (at that time mostly de-central 
routes out of the big hubs, between “secondary airports”). For example, ticket prices in the 
USA have decreased by more than 50% within the last 30 years (inflation correction 
considered). Established airlines like Lufthansa and Swiss had also to reduce significantly 
their flight prices on various flight routes. By this price competition, a lot of small but also 
big airlines like PanAm disappeared from the USA. The airline Eastern has been taken 
over from other airlines or other airlines merged with each other. Even stronger is the 
situation during economic crisis like between 1990-1993, 2000-2003, 2008-2010 (see e.g. 
the merger between United Airlines and Continental in 2010).20 
 
The definition: 
A low cost carrier is defined based on ICAO as follows: “An air carrier that has a relatively 
low-cost structure in comparison with other comparable carriers and offers low fares and 
rates.”21 
 
                                                          
18
 ref. Button, Wings Across Europe, 2004, p.57 
19
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.428-429  
20
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, p.430 
21
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, p.428 
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The low cost carrier offer their service on selected flight routes at low fares due to 
essential savings in sales and service costs.22 
Low cost carriers are not operating based on the so called “hub-and-spoke-principle” 
which is related to a high coordination and costs. They offer so called “point-to-point 
connections which are direct connections with short and medium distance flights. The low 
cost carriers often fly to de-central airports (regional airports) which enables them to have 
a very flexible and cost-efficient network planning for flight routes, and more cost-efficient 
route operating costs. Mainly due to a higher capacity utilisation of the aircrafts, a unique 
fleet of aircrafts, a strong cost management and the focus only on the air transportation 
(“no frills”) they can offer lower flight fares to customers. The passengers often have to 
pay for a service on board (food and drink) or the luggage and the seat reservation, which 
decreases the costs and also at the same time opens new sources of income.23 
 
 
2.3 Strategic alliances in the aviation market 
 
Many airlines have formed strategic alliances with other carriers. Strategic alliances help 
to overcome barriers to enter into markets, e.g. in those countries and regions where 
financial and legal restrictions exists. Strategic alliances between airlines started as code-
share agreements and nowadays they have developed into global alliances with huge 
networks.24 
Collaborations in the aviation sector are founded with the aim of extending the presence 
of the offer (e.g. code-sharing: several cooperating airlines fly under a flight number with 
joint handling) and / or the cost-cutting (common maintenance, mutual global passenger 
and cargo handling).25 
Strategic alliances have become an increased power in terms of networks, and have a 
high status (place value) in the aviation sector. Strategic alliances should ensure the 
worldwide coverage of the member companies through high-performance cooperation 
partner. Furthermore they should achieve enterprise-wide customer loyalty through mutual 
recognition of bonus programs, and achieve cost savings through sharing of sales and 
flight maintenance systems.26  
The first international alliance in the airline sector was initiated between British Island and 
Air Florida in 1986 in order to operate code-share flights. One successful alliance today is 
Star Alliance which was founded in 1997 by Lufthansa, United Airlines, SAS, Air Canada 
and Thai Airways as the first truly global alliance.27 
“The Star Alliance network is the leading global airline network, with the highest number of 
member airlines, daily flights, destinations and countries flown to. It was established in 
                                                          
22
 ref. Diesfeld, Strategieoptionen fuer den Ausbau Strategischer Allianzen, 2004, p.444 
23
 ref. Rürup and Reichart, Determinanten der Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit im internationalen 
    Luftverkehr, March 2014, pp.17-18 
24
 ref. Vasigh and others, Introduction to Air Transport Economics, 2008, pp.166-167 
25
 ref. Aberle, Transportwirtschaft, 2009, p.87  
26
 ref. Aberle, Transportwirtschaft, 2009, p.61 
27
 ref. Vasigh and others, Introduction to Air Transport Economics, 2008, pp.166-167 
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1997 as the first truly global airline alliance to offer customers convenient worldwide reach 
and a smoother travel experience.”28 
“Its acceptance by the market has been recognised by numerous awards, including the Air 
Transport World Market Leadership Award and Best Airline Alliance by both Business 
Traveller Magazine and Skytrax. The member airlines are: Adria Airways, Aegean 
Airlines, Air Canada, Air China, Air India, Air New Zealand, ANA, Asiana Airlines, 
Austrian, Avianca, Avianca in Brazil, Brussels Airlines, Copa Airlines, Croatia Airlines, 
EGYPTAIR, Ethiopian Airlines, EVA Air, LOT Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, Scandinavian 
Airlines, Shenzhen Airlines, Singapore Airlines, South African Airways, SWISS, TAP 
Portugal, Turkish Airlines, THAI and United. Overall, the Star Alliance network currently 
offers more than 18,500 daily flights to 1,330 airports in 192 countries.”29 
Some facts and figures concerning the Star Alliance are shown in the following chart:30 
    
    Figure 1: Star Alliance - facts and figures 
 
Further big and successful strategic alliances in the aviation market besides Star Alliance 
are Oneworld and SkyTeam. 
The main benefits of strategic alliances for the customers are: more offer, comfort and 
premium benefits.31 
                                     
                                     Figure 2: Benefits of a strategic alliance 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 ref. http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/, 15.08.2015 
29
 ref. http://www.staralliance.com/assets/doc/en/about/member-
airlines/pdf/Star_Alliance_Chronological_History.pdf, 01.09.2015 
30
 ref. http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/member_airlines/, 15.08.2015 
31
 ref. Style, Alliances & Partnership Development, UAB lecture notes, April 2015, p.10 
Passengers per year: Daily departures: Countries served:
641,10 million over 18.500 192
Number of aircraft: Sales Revenue (in US$): Number of lounges:
4.657 179,05 billion over 1.000
Member Airlines: Number of employees: Number of airports:
28 432.603 1.330
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3 Traditional airlines and low cost carriers – competitor analysis 
 
3.1 Market share development (of airline types) 
 
Concerning the market share of low cost carriers and the so called traditional airlines 
(scheduled airlines and charter airlines) I have done some market research. 
 
3.1.1 The development of the market share worldwide and in Europe 
 
                   
Figure 3: Low cost carriers – historical growth development 2000-2006 worldwide 
 
The above graphic which was published by IATA in 2006 shows the historical growth rates 
of low cost carriers worldwide per region from 2000 until 2006. As we learn from that 
chart, the main focus of the overall business was and is still in the United States and in 
Europe.32 
Concerning Europe, the Mercer Management Consulting Company did a market study in 
2002 in which they investigated the impact of low cost carrier. Based on this study, the 
market share figure of low cost carriers had been forecasted to amount to approximately 
25% in the year 2010 (Intra-European Market Share, PAX). In the year 2000 the 
traditional airlines had 75%, the biggest market share in civil aviation. The remaining 
market shares have been shared between the charter airlines (20%) and the low cost 
carriers (5%). Mercer forecasted that until the year 2010 the market share of traditional 
airlines will decrease by 15% to 60% and the market share of charter airlines will 
decrease by 5% to 15%. It was said that only the low cost carriers will have a significant 
growth of market share (a five-time growth) to 25% by 2010. The reason which has been 
given for this development has been that the low cost carrier will take over parts of the 
single seat sale and of the charter business. A further reason which was given was that 
                                                          
32
 ref. Smyth and others, Airline Cost Performance, IATA, July 2006, p.14 
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some market niches will result out of the fusions of traditional airlines which will be taken 
over by the low cost carriers.33 
 
                                    
Figure 4: Growth development various airline types 2000-2010 Europe 
 
When we see the actual figures of the market share between the various types of airlines, 
the former forecasts from Mercer came true or rather had been exceeded. 
Within the last few years the low cost carriers have developed to a strong competition for 
European traditional airlines, and between 2001 and 2012 the low cost carriers have 
increased their market share from 5% to 37% (data based on the whole number of 
passenger traffic within Europe).  
Low cost carrier – market share related to seat capacity between 2001 and 2012 
(worldwide and Europe): 
 
Figure 5: LCC – market share related to seat capacity 2001-2012 (worldwide and Europe) 
                                                          
33
 ref. Mercer Management Consulting, 2002, Impact of Low Cost Carriers, p.21 
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The annual growth rate of the low cost carriers has decreased within the last few years. 
Due to a study of the European Low Fare Airline Association (ELFAA) the forecast of the 
share of low cost carriers within Europe will reach between 45 and 53 percent by the year 
2020. 
This increased market share of low cost carriers is mainly based on price advantages, e.g. 
no usage of cost intensive hub-and-spoke-systems and the usage of an unique type of 
aircraft fleet (more reasons see under chapter 3.4 cost and price calculation). 
The low cost airlines also profit from the fact that the price sensitiveness of flight 
passengers has increased. The customer requirements differ normally related to the flight 
time, but in the short and medium distance traffic it can be seen a growing cost 
awareness. This is also true for private and business travel. Also business travellers are 
willing to accept longer travel times and less service and comfort if the price for the ticket 
is lower. On long distance flights this trend has not been seen so strong yet.34 
In the following sub chapter I will give some information about the development of the 
aviation market (traditional airlines vs. low cost carrier) using Germany and Spain as 
examples. I chose these two countries mainly because of the following reasons: The low 
cost market share in Spain is significantly high compared to other European countries. 
According to Eurostat statistics in 2014, Spain is the first tourist destination preferred by 
the European tourists.35 I chose Germany as this country has the second highest number 
of flight passenger flying to Spain (based on the Ministero de Industria, Energía y 
Turismo). Another reason to give information about these countries is that my expert 
interviews (chapter number five) were done with Lufthansa and Vueling. This airlines are 
two very important representatives of both countries in the aviation sector. 
 
 
3.1.2 The development of the market share in Germany and Spain  
 
The development of the market in Germany 
The author Mr. Eckard Bergmann recently published his new book “Fliegen - ein (Alb-) 
Traum?” (“Flying – a nightmare or dream?”) which contains current figures concerning 
market share and passenger development. The following chart shows the market share of 
scheduled airlines, charter airlines and low cost carriers between 2002 and 2013 in 
Germany. 
                                                          
34
 ref. Rürup and Reichart, Determinanten der Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit im internationalen 
    Luftverkehr, March 2014, pp.45-46 
35
 ref. http://tambiensomosasi.es/%C2%ADespana-destino-turistico-europeos/, 04.10.2015 
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Scheduled Airline 71% 67% 65% 61% 60% 59% 58% 58% 53% 55% 55% 55%
Charter Airline 24% 23% 21% 20% 17% 15% 14% 13% 12% 13% 13% 13%
Low Cost Carrier 5% 10% 15% 19% 23% 26% 28% 29% 34% 32% 32% 32%
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Figure 6: Market share development of airline types 2002-2013 (Germany) 
As we can learn from the data and the graph that since 2011 the market shares have 
remained the same. The author Mr. Bergmann mentions that the reason for the 
“stagnation” is based on the migration of the business models as the market has 
consolidated and the growth continues to be parallel. 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Scheduled Airline -3,6% -2,6% -3,3% -1,6% -1,1% -0,6% -0,4% -4,2% 1,6% 0,2% -0,3%
Charter Airline -1,1% -2,4% -1,0% -3,0% -1,8% -0,9% -0,7% -1,0% 0,4% 0,0% -0,1%
Low Cost Carrier 4,7% 5,0% 4,3% 4,6% 2,9% 1,5% 1,1% 5,2% -2,0% -0,2% 0,4%
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***shift of market shares since 2003 vs. previous year (Germany based on passenger numbers)***
TOTAL: Scheduled Airl.: (-16.0% ) Charter Airl. (-11.5%)             LCC (+27.5%)
 
Figure 7: Shift of market share development of airline types 2003-2013 (Germany) 
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The low cost carriers in Germany increased their market share within the last ten years 
(until 2013) by +27.5%. In the same time period the market share of charter airlines 
decreased by -11.5%, and of scheduled airlines (line airlines) by -16%. These figures are 
based on the assumption that there have not been essential shifts between charter 
airlines and scheduled airlines. The chance to gain more market share for low cost 
carriers is especially higher during economic crisis as companies are willing to save more 
travel costs within difficult economically times. They therefore also book flights with low 
cost carriers instead of traditional airlines when it comes to business travel. This is also 
one reason why traditional airlines are also creating or buying their own low cost carriers 
in order to compensate the shifts of market share and sales within their own enterprises. 
Examples are e.g. Lufthansa with Germanwings, IAG (British Airways/Iberia) with Vueling 
and Air France/KLM with TRANSAVIA. 
Based on Bergmann’s data, at the beginning of this millennium the market share of the 
low cost carrier amounted to approximately 5 % (in Germany and in Europe). Today the 
low cost carriers have an overall market share within the European aviation market of 
around 30% (in Germany approximately 32%). 
At the beginning the low cost carriers took mostly shares from the scheduled airlines – but 
since 2005 we see that also the charter airlines have lost a substantial part of their market 
share as the low cost carrier also offered flights to vacation destination, e.g. to the 
Mediterranean, the Canary Islands or to other “warm-water-destinations” within Europe or 
closed to Europe. Especially “short-term tourists” are using these offers. The result is that 
the route length of the low cost carriers has increased from ca. 1.5 hours (2005) to ca. 1.9 
hours (2014) by 46%.36 
Remark: Due to the migration of the business models within the last years it is more and 
more difficult to clearly define a low cost carrier (expect the real low cost carrier like e.g 
Ryanair and Easyjet). The migration of the business models also leads to differences 
(problems) concerning the assignation of the respective data in statistics. Mr. Bergmann 
also confirmed this fact to me in a personal e-mail dated 07. September 2015. He further 
mentioned in his e-mail that “today everybody is flying against everybody”, especially 
since Ryanair announced in 2014 to increase flights to primary airports and that they 
intend to increase the share of business passenger e.g. by implementing of various 
booking status.37 
According to an article of the German magazine “Handelsblatt” Ryanair intends to 
increase their business in Germany significantly. The management of Ryanair informed 
that the airline will increase its market share in Germany from currently 5% to 
approximately 15-20% within the next three or four years. In October 2015 the airline will 
open a new base in Berlin from which they will operate next summer 18 new 
destinations.38 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.437-439 
37
 ref. own words M. Widmann and confirmation Mr. Bergmann (e-mail, 07.09.2015) 
38
 ref. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/handel-konsumgueter/billigflieger-ryanair-greift-
lufthansa-und-air-berlin-an-/12389238.html, 13.10.2015 
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The development of the market in Spain 
           
Figure 8: Number of int. passenger arrivals Spain via air transportation (2001-2013) 
The above graphic shows the development of the number of international flight 
passengers which have flown into Spain between 2001 and 2013. The graphic also 
distinguishes between traditional airlines and low cost carrier. As we can see the share of 
flight passengers travelling by low cost carrier increased sharply. Today the low cost 
carrier passengers amount to 54.2% of the whole air passengers in Spain. 
The next two charts visualise the exact development of the number of passengers 
respectively, only regarding the low cost carrier and traditional airlines in Spain within the 
same time period (2001 to 2013). 
           
Figure 9: Number of int. passenger arrivals Spain via low cost carriers (2001-2013) 
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As we can see from the above chart, the number of fight passengers with low cost carriers 
increased constantly between 2001 and 2013. Even during the financial crisis (2007 until 
2009) the figures first continued to grow. There has been a slight decrease which can be 
seen also as stagnation in the business year 2009. After that time the growth continued. A 
further comment is that the crisis had affected the overall aviation business. However, the 
low cost carrier gained profit out of that time because some business passengers also 
changed now from traditional airlines to low cost carriers in the short-haul market. 
            
Figure 10: Number of int. passenger arrivals Spain via traditional airlines (2001-2013) 
Concerning the development of the number of passengers of traditional airlines, it can be 
pointed out that from 2001 until 2005 the figures decreased slightly. A significant change 
can be seen since the financial world crisis which started in 2007, with the bankruptcy of 
the Lehman Brothers bank. The effect of the crisis was very strong between 2008 and 
2009. In these years the traditional airlines lost a high number of passengers, but after the 
end of the financial crisis the number of passengers increased slightly again but never 
reached the levels previously seen.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 ref. Ministero de Industria, Energía y Turismo, Turismo, tráfico aéreo y compañías aéreas de  
   bajo coste, 2013, pp.15-17 
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3.2 The actual low cost carrier market in Europe 
 
“The Low Cost Carrier Monitor, jointly issued by ADV (German Airports Association) and 
DLR (German Aerospace Center), informs on significant features of the low cost carrier 
traffic and current developments in this market segment two times a year. Topics covered 
include e.g. the number and relative importance of low cost carriers, their supply including 
air fares, and passenger demand of low cost services.”40 
Concerning the latest “Low Cost Carrier Monitor (1/2015)” the total number of the 
operating low cost carriers decreased slightly, as some companies are in the status of 
liquidation or have been taken over from other airlines. Iceland Express has been taken 
over by WOW and also Flybaboo does not fly anymore as an own brand, as Darwin 
Airline has taken over. Furthermore, Volare has been integrated into Alitalia. These are 
only some recent examples.41 
The airlines operating in the low cost sector define their offer very differently, and 
therefore only a few demarcation criteria like low prices, general availability and direct 
sales via internet can be defined for this segment. 
As already mentioned above (chapter 3.1.2) in some cases it exists a so called latitude, 
when it comes to the assignment if an airline is counted as low cost or traditional. In some 
airlines a migration of the business models is ongoing which makes a clear assignment to 
the low cost segment more difficult. Air Berlin for example, is a typical example. The 
former charter airline entered long time ago with the “Cityshuttle” business into the low 
cost segment, but due to several takeovers (e.g. LTU, DBA, Gexx), and also due to the 
cooperation with Etihad and the participation in the strategic alliance “Oneworld”, a clear 
assignment of low cost flight routes has become more difficult. Therefore in the statistics 
of the DLR, only the previous low cost flight routes, as well those which correspond to 
them are taken into account. Flights to classical tourist destinations are not included in the 
DLR statistics.42 
The following table shows the low cost airlines which are operating in Europe. These 
airlines can be fully or mainly assigned to the low cost segment. The airlines listed under 
Pos. 1 to Pos. 21 are flying into and out of Germany. The other remaining airlines (Pos. 22 
to Pos. 28) are flying to and from other European countries (not including Germany). In 
the meanwhile also non-European companies are entering into the European market, e.g. 
Flydubai.43 
                                                          
40
 ref. http://www.dlr.de/fw/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-2961/9753_read-19682/, 08.09.2015 
41
 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor, 1/2015, p.7 
42
 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor, 1/2015, p.2 
43
 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor, 1/2015, pp.2+7 
  Page: 23/118
  
                          
Pos. Name of Airline
IATA 
Code Website Logo
1 Aer Lingus EI www.aerlingus.com
2 Air Arabia Maroc 3O www.airarabia.com
3 Air Baltic BT www.airbaltic.com
4 Air Berlin AB www.airberlin.com
5 Blue Air 0B www.blueairweb.com
6 Corendon XC www.corendon.com
7 Easyjet U2 www.easyjet.com
8 flybe BE www.flybe.com
9 Germanwings 4U www.germanwings.com
10 HOP! A5 www.hop.fr
11 Iberia Express I2 www.iberiaexpress.com
12 Intersky 3L www.intersky.biz
13 Jet 2 LS www.jet2.com
14 Niki HG www.flyniki.com
15 Norwegian DY www.norwegian.no
16 Ryanair FR www.ryanair.com
17 Transavia HV www.transavia.com
18 Vueling VY www.vueling.com
19 Wizz W6 www.wizzair.com
20 Wizz Ukraine WU www.wizzair.com
21 WOW WW www.wowair.com
22 Air Italy I9 www.airitaly.it
23 Blue Panorama BV www.blu-express.com
24 Corendon Dutch CND www.corendon.com
25 Meridiana IG www.meridiana.com
26 Transavia (France) TO www.transavia.com
27 Volare VA www.volareweb.com
28 Volotea V7 www.volotea.com  
Figure 11: Overview low cost carriers Europe 
 
Ryanair remain still the biggest low cost airline in Europe and had more than 8.300 
departures in January 2015. Easyjet is the second biggest low cost carrier in Europe 
(5.900 departures in January 2015). Flybe and Norwegian follow in third and fourth 
biggest, while Germanwings remains number five regarding to departure figures in 
January within Europe. The strategies of the airlines are different, for example, Ryanair 
flies on average only five flights per week per route, while Germanwings has nine, and 
flybe 12 fights per route per week. Regarding this ranking Air Berlin is number six followed 
by Vueling and Wizz which both registered a strong growth of more than 20%. The airline 
HOP! (newly founded by Air France) has ranked number nine. The following table shows 
the detailed data of the top ten low cost carriers in Europe in January 2015.44 
 
                                                          
44
 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor, 1/2015, pp.7+14 
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Pos. Name of Airline Take-Offs Seats Flight Routes
1 Ryanair 8.373 1.582.494 1.581
2 Easyjet 5.958 970.776 955
3 Flybe 3.287 231.503 272
4 Norwegian 2.794 515.763 452
5 Germanwings 2.709 343.648 306
6 Air Berlin (LCC) 2.409 356.178 208
7 Vueling 2.070 369.000 291
8 Wizz 1.859 334.620 550
9 HOP! 1.441 91.782 112
10 Aer Lingus 1.348 183.054 134
01/2015
 
Figure 12: LCC - overview take-offs, seats and flight routes Europe per airline (01/2015) 
The consolidation in the low cost carrier sector is still ongoing. Clickair has been 
integrated in Vueling while Windjet announced insolvency in August 2012. Smaller airlines 
have disappeared from the market, and others like Wizz are growing. In total the 
European low cost carrier segment has registered an increase of 5%. 
Since the year 2006 there has been a constant growth in the number of flight routes in the 
winter months (only in 2013 was there a decrease). The growth in 2015 amounts to a plus 
of 3.2 % vs. the same time period of the previous year and reached the number of 5.000 
flights (routes) which is a record in a winter/spring period. Germany grew 11.2%, and had 
an even higher growth rate regarding flight routes. Concerning the flights offered, the 
increase in Europe amounts to 5% while in Germany the rate was 17.3%. The growth in 
Germany is due to the restructuring of Lufthansa and Germanwings.  
Great Britain still remains the biggest country concerning low cost operations (departures 
as well as arrivals), and registered 7.700 (+9.7%) take offs per week in January this year. 
Germany, Italy, Spain and France follow with slightly more than 3.000 flights (see 
following chart no. 13).45 
                         
Pos. Country Take-Offs Seats Flight Routes
1 Great Britain 7.745 1.034.926 872
2 Germany 4.783 682.005 518
3 Italy 3.883 672.692 609
4 Spain 3.790 683.192 663
5 France 3.332 417.277 441
6 Ireland 1.443 224.172 144
7 Norway 1.335 246.470 170
8 Poland 859 133.900 125
9 Netherlands 851 148.151 205
10 Sweden 841 132.449 147
01/2015
 
Figure 13: LCC - overview take-offs, seats and flight routes in Europe per country (01/2015) 
Out of the 5.000 flight routes, more than 4.500 (90%) are operated by only one low cost 
carrier. Only 484 routes are operated by two and 20 flight routes by more than two low 
                                                          
45
 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor 1/2015, pp.7-8, 14 
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cost carriers. That means the competition on same flight routes within Europe is still 
relatively low. 
Barcelona and Dublin are the biggest airports in Europe related to take-offs per week of 
low cost carriers. This fact is based due to the increased offer of Vueling and Ryanair in 
Barcelona, and due to flybe and Ryanair in Dublin. It can be mentioned that also several 
German airports register an increase of low cost flights which is due to the restructuring of 
Lufthansa and Germanwings, as domestic and European flights are now operated by 
Germanwings instead by Lufthansa (even flights from and to Frankfurt and Munich). 
Within Europe the low cost carrier market amounted to 28% of all flights during the winter 
season 2015, while more than 70% of flights were operated by the traditional line and 
charter operators. The remaining part of the market was operated by regional airlines 
which are cooperating in the most cases with a bigger airline. 
Another trend to be considered is long-haul flights operated by low cost carriers. Due to 
cost issues, Air Asia recently cancelled all flights from Asia to Great Britain and Germany. 
However, Norwegian had tried to enter into this market with modern aircraft (B787). Since 
March 2015 Norwegian increased the offers of flights to Thailand and North America 
(outbound from Stockholm, Copenhagen and London-Gatwick).46 
 
 
3.3 Medium-term outlook (up to 2020) – overall European aviation 
market 
 
Concerning the further development of the overall European aviation market for the next 
few years based on statistics of Eurocontrol, the following statements can be given: 
According to the statistics of Eurocontrol it can be mentioned that the traffic growth in 
Europe stabilises at ca. 2.6% increase per year after 2015. The growth rate of 2.4%-2.6% 
per year in the period 2015-2017 will decrease in 2018 to 2.3% due to the lack of capacity 
(airport capacity constraints). However, the inauguration of the new airport in Istanbul in 
2019 will have a positive influence on the growth figures. Due to this new airport, the 
growth rates will increase to 2.8% within the years 2019-2020. 
The following chart shows the “Average Annual Growth of Flights per State, 2020 vs. 
2013”. As we can see the growth across Europe is different. “While the growth (in 
percentage terms) is much weaker in the more mature markets of Western Europe, it is 
still the busiest States (France, Germany followed by Italy, Spain and UK) which will see 
the greatest number of extra flights per day.” The highest growth rates and also the 
highest number of extra flights per day will be seen in Turkey. In Turkey the average 
annual growth rate over the seven years amounts to 7.2% and the number of additional 
flights per day in 2020 will be 1.945.47 
 
                                                          
46
 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor 1/2015, p.8 
47
 ref. Eurocontrol, Flight Movements and Service Units 2014-2020, September 2014, p.28 
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Figure 14: Average annual growth of flights per state, 2020 vs. 2013 
 
 
3.4 Cost and price calculation / comparison of prices 
 
3.4.1 Cost calculation – differences between low cost carriers and traditional 
airlines 
 
Several studies show that the cost structure of low cost carriers is more than 50% less 
than the cost structure of a traditional airline. The following table shows how the low cost 
carrier reach this price calculation and which cost advantages they can achieve in detail 
per available seat kilometre (ASK) or seat kilometre offered (SKO).         
                  
Cost
 reduction Cost
Traditional Carrier 100%
higher seat density -15 85
higher aircraft productivity -5 80
lower Crew costs -3 77
less ground staffs -4 73
lower airport and landing fees -6 67
unique type of aircraft fleet -2 65
lower station costs/outsourced handling -10 55
no bord service for free -6 49
no commission -3 46
lower sales and reservation costs -3 43
lower administration costs -2 41
41%Low Cost airlines compared to traditional carriers
Low Cost Carrier
 
Figure 15: Cost calculation - differences between low cost carriers and traditional airlines 
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The above listed data show the cost advantages of a „Core-Low-Cost-Carrier“ like 
Ryanair. Not all low cost carriers are able to achieve these cost advantages. E.g. EasyJet, 
Air Berlin or Germanwings are also low cost carriers, and as the table below show they 
are not able to produce at this price level. The following graphic also shows the costs per 
available seat kilometre (ASK) from Air Berlin, Ryanair and EasyJet, it also contains data 
from Lufthansa (which represent the traditional airlines).            
     
4,14
8,01
3,51
5,75
7,46
8,97
3,56
5,91
11,5
1,7
0,2 0,4
Air Berlin Lufthansa Ryanair EasyJet
Cost per available seat kilometre (ASK) in €-cents 
- 2012 vs. 2005 (based on Airline annual reports) -
Cost/ASK 2005 (€-cents) Cost/ASK 2012 (€-cents)
Increase of cost p.a. (%)
 
Figure 16: Cost per available seat kilometre (ASK) - 2012 vs. 2005  
 
Between 2005 and 2012 Air Berlin registered a significant increase of the cost per 
available seat kilometre (ASK) as the airline developed from a low cost carrier to a full-
service-airline (how they define them by themselves today). However, they operated also 
as a low cost carrier, charter airline and a full-service-airline. Other airlines like Vueling 
and EasyJet offer additional services and do not fly just to so called secondary airports 
with lower handling and landing fees like Girona or Frankfurt Hahn. It can be said that low 
cost carrier in Europe can operate to 50% of the costs of a traditional airline which means 
that the average costs/ASK of a low cost airline amounts approx. 3.5 to 6.0 Euro-cents 
while the average costs/ASK of a traditional carrier amounts 8.0 to 11.0 EUR-cents. 
Due to higher aircraft capacity utilisation (between 5% and 10%) and additional sales, for 
example, out of onboard service, hotel bookings etc. (Ryanair 2013/2014: 24.8%), the low 
cost carriers are increasing their sales. Furthermore the passengers often have to pay an 
extra fee in case they want to check-in luggage.  
It has to be mentioned that the share of the fuel costs (regarding the total costs) is higher 
for low cost carriers than that of traditional airlines. This means that fuel price increases 
have a bigger impact for low cost carriers.48 From my point of view this might be a reason 
                                                          
48
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.432-434 / charts own schema based on 
   Bergmann 
Remark concerning Growth of ASK: 
Air Berlin plc. +104% / Lufthansa +80% / Ryanair +200% / EasyJet +125% 
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why low cost carriers are still not operating on long-haul flights (without some exceptions, 
for example Norwegian). 
 
 
3.4.2 Potential cost savings for airlines 
 
The following extract of the bullet-points which have been published in a presentation 
within the IATA 2nd Airline Cost Conference (ACC) in 2014 summarise the main points of 
cost savings, and also show up further cost saving potentials for an (low cost) airline. 
“How to make the lowest cost airline seat?” 
Aircraft Costs 
 One aircraft type, one size, one class, simple galleys 
 More seats reduces unit costs 
 Aircraft flights/hours can be increased (e.g. 25 min Turns) 
Crew Costs (LCC single aisle) 
 Schedule all aircraft to allow for 2 crews per day (morning and afternoon) 
 Eliminate night stops (costly not only for crew) 
 Single type (and size) of aircraft at each base helps to minimise crew costs. 
     Day-to-day operations are therefore easier. 
Sales & Marketing 
 Widen the cheapest channel and restrict the most expensive one 
 Internet has four major advantages:  
     Cheapest distribution channel, direct contact with customer, airline gets cash faster,  
     enables additional selling, e.g. insurance, car hire etc. 
 
Ground Operations – an undervalued key to low cost carrier success 
 Schedule drives many costs at the airport 
 25 minute turnarounds enable ground crew to handle more turns per shift 
 Pilots should do the load & trim sheet – keeps ground operations simpler 
 Outbound Bags must be at gate/stand when aircraft arrives  
 Closing Check-in at 30-45 minutes before departure is critical for efficiency and 
     punctuality  
 Web check-in & kiosks reduce queues, headcount and costs  
On Board Products – now additional revenue  
 Customers don’t chose airlines because of on-board product (short-haul) 
 Price, schedule and reliability tend to be the top three deciding factors for all 
    short-haul customers  
 Non-allocated seating is efficient for the airlines but customers don’t like it.  
     Additional charge for advance selection of seats is possible. 
 WIFI is becoming more and more important for flight passengers. 
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Airports 
 It is estimated that 25% of Ryanair’s cost advantage is due to the usage of low cost 
     airports – very few airlines leverage their power/influence out of their airports 
 LCC’s fast-turn, high passenger loads are also attractive for improving airport  
    efficiency which might be a factor in reduced fees (LGW example) 
 Efficient ground operations and short approach and taxi times  
    are attractive and need to be negotiated (e.g. CGK T1a vs Terminal 2) 
 Distance from the city is an issue and not to be discounted 
Fuel 
 Good training and feedback helps pilots to plan and achieve lower fuel costs 
 Differing prices in different airports may make it attractive to burn more fuel  
     (tankering)  
 Are the aircraft as light as can be? Ovens, manuals, spares, water quantity, etc. 
 APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) usage and single engine taxi-in procedures in place? 
Overheads 
 Management can be very complex and layered (Take out a layer (or two) – DON’T  
     ADD ANY!) 
 Keep objectives simple – K.I.S.S. – Keep It Short & Simple 
 Use simple, fast, approximate and effective measurement systems 
Remark: The above mentioned bullet-points are an extract of the whole presentation. Also 
some further issues, for example, maintenance costs, weight related charges and 
information systems have been discussed as cost saving potentials within the 
presentation.49 
 
 
3.4.3 Flight price comparison between low cost carriers 
 
The flight prices of low cost carriers differ when it comes to the destinations and more so 
on how advanced the booking is made. The flight prices are often not the end price the 
customer gets, as in many cases additional charges (e.g. additional fees for luggage, seat 
reservation, taxes) are not included. 
A study of the “Deutsches Zentrum fuer Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR)” investigated prices of 
low cost carriers based on more than 60 flight routes and the following four time periods of 
booking in advance: one day, one week, one month and three months. As it is mentioned 
in the study, this selection of flight routes is representative (approximately 10% of all low 
cost carrier flight routes which have been operated in autumn 2012). The results have 
been as follows: 
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 ref. McCarthy, Low Cost Carriers Success Factors, IATA ACC, August 2014, pp.9-21 
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Airline
Average Flight Price 
(Basic Tariff, only Flight 
Price)
Average Gross Flight Price
 (incl. Taxes/Additional 
Charges)
Ryanair (FR) 38,97 € 53,90 €
EasyJet (U2) 65,93 € 76,93 €
Germanwings (4U) 86,62 € 110,10 €
Air Berlin (AB) 51,90 € 114,77 €
Intersky (3L) 105,00 € 169,00 €
Wizz (W6) 58,74 € 66,74 €
**for selected days**
 
Figure 17: Flight prices of selected low cost carriers (average) 
 
As you can see (following chart no. 18) prices differ enormously depending on the booking 
time and when the flight takes place. Making a booking in a short period of time in 
advance of the flight, the price can be much more compared to booking the flight one or 
three months in advance. The gross flight prices differ between ca. 100 € and 200 € if 
booking a flight one day in advance, and between ca. 21 € and 56 € if booking around 
three months in advance. This data is related to the main low cost carriers in Germany.50 
                   
Figure 18: Flight prices selected low cost carriers based on booking time in advance (DLR 2012) 
Based on investigations of a newer study from the DLR from 2014, the cheapest flight 
price can be booked approximately one month in advance (see graphic no. 19). 
                                                          
50
 ref. Berster, Low Cost Carrier in Deutschland, Europa und weltweit, DLR, December 2012,  
    pp.62-64 / chart own schema based on Berster 
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69% 81%
1 DAY 7 DAYS 1 MONTH 3 MONTHS
Flight price related to average price (dependend 
of booking time before departure)
*Sring 2014, Source DLR 16.04.2014, average values of Ryanair, 
EasyJet, Germanwings, Air Berlin and WIZZ)*
 
Figure 19: Flight prices selected low cost carriers based on booking time in advance (DLR 2014) 
 
The challenge for the pricing department is to increase the flight price closer to the flight 
taking place in order that the average profit per ticket is sufficient to recover the costs of 
the flight. Price management is done automatically, and when a defined capacity is 
reached, the prices will climb higher. Manual changes of flight prices are also possible, for 
example in cases where there are special events like a concert or major sporting events. 
The next graphic (chart no. 20) gives an overview about the flight price and costs per flight 
hour based on the respective booking times in advance of the flight. The data is related to 
Air Berlin, EasyJet and Ryanair on short and medium-haul flights within Europe. 
Furthermore the graphic includes an average value (database study of the DLR from the 
year 2012).  
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flight price 1 month before flight
flight price 3 months before flight
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Figure 20: Examples ticket price management (DLR 2012 and airline reports) 
Looking at this data, 64% of the whole costs of a flight are covered by the flight price if 
booked three months before flying. 91% of the costs are covered if booked one month in 
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advance (expect for Air Berlin which already has 117% of the costs covered when booking 
one month in advance). 156% of the costs are covered with bookings seven days in 
advance, and 232% when flight is booked one day before departure.  
In summary, no more than 75% of the whole flight tickets have to be sold more than one 
week in advance of the flight. Otherwise the flight costs might not be covered by the 
revenues. In case the 75% of the whole seat capacity is reached earlier than one week 
before the flight takes place, the prices have to be increased earlier (Yield-
Management).51 
Customers can buy the tickets at the lowest price if they book approximately three months 
in advance of the flight date. The newer study of DLR from 2014 showed that the lowest 
price can be reached when the booking takes place approximately one month in advance. 
Once the booking date passes less than one month from the flight date, generally the 
price will increase.  
 
3.5 Fleet of low cost carriers 
 
The European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA) publishes regularly statistics about 
their member airlines, as well information concerning the fleet of the airlines. The following 
table is part of the latest statistic which has been published in December 2014.  
       
Figure 21: Low cost carriers - overview fleet (based on ELFAA, Dec. 2014) 
According to the data Ryanair has the biggest fleet with 300 aircraft, followed by EasyJet 
with 226 aircrafts. This two low cost carriers operate the newest aircraft with an average of 
approximately five years (besides Wizz Air).52 
In comparison the latest statistic of the DLR Low Cost Monitor (1/2015) includes already 
some actualised figures, as well as other airlines. Also in this statistic, Ryanair (increased 
number of aircraft to 315) and Easyjet (decreased number of aircraft to 209) operate the 
                                                          
51
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.442-444 / charts own schema based on 
    Bergmann 
52
 ref. ELFAA, members' statistics, December 2014, p.3 
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biggest fleet in the low cost carrier segment. An analysis about the age of the aircraft fleet 
is not included in this statistic from the DLR.53  
It is very important to mention that the number of aircraft differs between these two 
statistics. For example there is a larger difference in the number of aircraft if you look at 
Norwegian. This fact might be based on the different way of assignment of data to the low 
cost segment. As explained in chapter no. 3.2, the DLR only counts real low cost routes 
within Europe and no long-haul flights to the United States or Asia like, however, 
Norwegian offers in their product portfolio. Other reasons for the differences of data are 
that some airlines in the meanwhile have received new aircraft and others have sold 
some.  
            
Pos. Name of Airline Logo Fleet
1 Aer Lingus 36 aircrafts (A320: 30, A319: 4, A321: 2) 
2 Air Arabia Maroc 4 aircrafts (A320: 4) 
3 Air Baltic 25 aircrafts (B737: 13, D8: 12) 
4 Air Berlin 85 aircrafts [Euro] (A319/20/21: 49, B737: 34, ATR:2) 
5 Blue Air 11 aircrafts (B737: 11) 
6 Corendon 11 aircrafts (B737: 8, A320: 3) 
7 Easyjet 209 aircrafts (A319: 137, A320: 72) 
8 flybe 61 aircrafts (D8: 45, E: 16) 
9 Germanwings 81 aircrafts (A319: 43, A320: 17, C: 21) 
10 HOP! 98 aircrafts (ATR: 24, E: 43, CRJ: 31)
11 Iberia Express 16 aircrafts (A320: 16) 
12 Intersky 5 aircrafts (D8: 3; ATR: 2)
13 Jet 2 56 aircrafts (B737-300: 45, B757-200: 11) 
14 Niki 21 aircrafts A319/A320/A321: 19, E: 2)
15 Norwegian 85 aircrafts (B737: 76, ATR: 1, B787: 8) 
16 Ryanair 315 aircrafts (B737: 313, A320:2)
17 Transavia 33 aircrafts (B737: 33) 
18 Vueling 94 aircrafts (A320: 90, A319: 4) 
19 Wizz 53 aircrafts (A320: 53) 
20 Wizz Ukraine 2 aircrafts (A320: 2) 
21 WOW 8 aircrafts (A320: 3, A319: 5) 
22 Air Italy 10 aircrafts (B737: 7 B767: 3) (für Meridiana)
23 Blue Panorama 3 aircrafts (B737:3)
24 Corendon Dutch 2 aircrafts (B737: 2)
25 Meridiana 16 aircrafts (A320: 6, MD82/83: 10)
26 Transavia (France) 17 aircrafts (B737: 15, A320: 2)
27 Volare 1 aircraft (A320: 1)
28 Volotea 16 aircrafts (B717: 16)  
Figure 22: Low cost carriers - overview fleet (based on DLR Low Cost Monitor, 01/2015) 
As we can see from both statistics, the low cost carriers are using mainly the same type of 
aircraft. As explained in the chapters no. 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 this enables the airline to save 
essential costs as every crew member can fly on almost every aircraft. A synergy effect 
takes place as well if all the aircraft are the same when it comes to maintenance. 
Furthermore the age of the aircraft are relatively young within the low cost carrier fleet.  
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 ref. DLR, Low Cost Monitor 1/2015, pp.2+7 / chart own schema based on Low Cost Monitor 
  Page: 34/118
  
3.6 Safety aspects 
 
Safety is the highest priority in the aviation sector. The authorities (registration offices) of 
each state/country have a high control function regarding the technical legality and 
economic performance of companies within the aviation sector.  
The “Luftverkehrsgesetz (LuftVG)” is the legal basis for Germany, regarding aviation 
safety, which is executed and controlled by the Luftfahrt Bundesamt (LBA). The Spanish 
counterpart is the Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea (AESA). 
In Germany the most important control authority is the LBA, which looks after the safety of 
the flights far in advance of each flight taken place. 
The LBA executes functions like registration and airworthiness checks of aviation 
products, ACAM (Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Monitoring), issue of permissions for 
aviation staffs, technical checks and the financial situation of aviation companies. 
The authority responsible in Europe is the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency – 
EASA) which is the centre of the European aviation politics. While the national aviation 
authorities are still executing a sustainable part of the operative tasks (e.g. registration of 
aircrafts) the EASA develops common safety and environmental standards. Furthermore 
EASA executes inspections in the member countries and also offers technical advice and 
training in order to reach the common set.54 
 
Safety aspects of low cost carriers 
It is a fact that low cost carriers save costs in field of service but not in field of safety. This 
confirms also a statement of the LBA. Each low cost carrier receives the operating licence 
from the respective aviation authority that they are based in (e.g. in Germany from the 
LBA). After issuing the licence, the airlines are monitored constantly with regard to 
maintenance aspects of the aircrafts, this applies to traditional and low cost carriers. 
There have been some safety concerns that pilots of low cost carriers have longer 
working hours than their traditional counterparts. The press manager of the LBA pointed 
out that each airline has to observe the flight hours and rest periods of the crew, as well 
as to register them in a transparent way. There was also concerns that low cost carriers 
also pay a lower salary than their traditional counterparts, however, the article mentions 
that the training of pilots (licence) is also controlled legally and this means that the pilots 
and other crew members have to pass the same necessary qualifications and tests as 
their traditional counterparts.55  
 
In order to improve the safety within the European aviation sector, the European 
Commission and the national civil aviation authorities of the member states have decided 
to deny “unsafe” airlines of operating in European airspace. Such “unsafe” airlines are 
listed in a common overview and the list is actualised constantly. Legal basis for this 
                                                          
54
 ref. Rommel, SE Strategisches Management, 2012/2013, pp.20-22 
55
 ref. Stiftung Warentest, Billig hat seinen Preis, 08/2003, p.81 
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“black list” is the regulation (EG) No. 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and the 
council of 14. December 2005. 
The safety criteria are defined by experts of the commission and the member states. It is 
mandatory for the states to execute the respective European decisions. 
The issue and withdrawal of traffic rights for foreign aviation companies as well as 
withdrawals of operating licenses for national aviation companies still remains under 
national responsibility (e.g. Germany: LBA, Spain: AESA). 
When a national authority informs the EU commission about a case of withdrawal of a 
traffic right, the Steering Committee decides if the respective company will be included in 
the overall “common black list”. If an airline is part of the “common black list” it has a 
European wide flight ban. All European aviation authorities will then be informed about 
their safety concerns. This procedure was also confirmed within a personal phone call 
with the LBA in Braunschweig dated 15.09.2015.56 
 
 
                                                          
56
ref.  http://www.lba.de/DE/Presse_POE/A_Z/A_Z_Flugverbot.html?nn=693032, 15.09.2015 
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4 General competitor strategies 
 
4.1 M. E. Porter’s theory 
 
Static approach of Porter 
In the 1980s Michael E. Porter investigated which competitive advantages and 
competitive strategies are relevant for a successful company. Within this investigation 
Porter developed four promising approaches in order to “outperform other companies in a 
sector”: The differentiation strategy (a), cost leadership strategy (b), and two concentration 
strategies (c) which are differentiation focus strategy (c1) and cost focus strategy (c2) (see 
diagram no. 23).57 
                         58 
Figure 23: Strategic approach according to Porter 
The way to realisation of the desired competitive advantage is the first classification 
criteria according to Porter. A company can reach a competitive advantage of its products 
or services either by respective differentiation or by lower costs. The strategy of 
differentiation leads to a relative benefit advantage and the strategy of lower cost leads to 
a relative cost advantage.  
The second classification criteria is related to the place of the competition (competitive 
scope). In this regard Porter distinguishes between specific sector and total sector wide 
strategies. A sector specific strategy is specified to specific customer groups (or product 
lines) and is based on either a differentiation of needs that were previously not yet met, or 
only met insufficiently. The industry-wide strategies are characterised by a generic 
approach without special focus on groups of customers or products.59 
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4.1.1 Differentiation strategy 
 
When considering the differentiation strategy, the creation of a distinctive and unique 
product is in the foreground, which has a special character for the customer when it 
comes to the perceived product differences (compared to competing products). This 
enables the realisation of competitive advantages. Such products with special features or 
characteristics bring additional benefits to the customer and let product preferences grow. 
This enables higher surcharges on the product or service. The additional benefit can be 
based on exclusive customer service or high-performance product quality or design, for 
example. A differentiation strategy can also influence and build up a product image by 
intensive use of marketing activities or by highlighting of certain unique performance-
based differentiation features. 
The targets of differentiation strategies are to reach a higher customer loyalty and the 
decrease of price elasticity of the demander. The result is the entry into a quasi-
monopolistic price range, in which the customers accepts higher prices for differentiated 
products than for undifferentiated products. 
However, a differentiation strategy not only includes benefits because also risks and 
dangers are associated as well. So it may be that competitors imitate certain product 
components which can reduce the effect of the differentiation.60 
 
 
4.1.2 Cost leadership strategy 
 
The aim of the cost leadership strategy is to realise relative cost advantages against 
competitors, and to ensure long-term competitive advantages. By a consequent 
implementation of economies of scale, learning and experience curve effects, and/or 
utilisation of favourable access to production factors, cost advantages can be realised. To 
enforce a comprehensive cost leadership strategy, it requires high own market share, 
market penetration and high efficiency of distribution channels. Furthermore, sufficient 
process innovations regarding cost-cutting in the production process are necessary. 
The cost leadership strategy is exclusively for companies with largely homogenous 
products, well-structured distribution channels and with a relatively high market share in 
the perspective sector. Furthermore, a relatively high market share allows the utilisation of 
effects related to the experience curve. If the previous mentioned conditions are fulfilled, 
the cost leader can reach a yield (return) above the industry average. 
Like mentioned in the differentiation strategy there are also risks regarding the cost 
leadership strategy. For example, technological changes due to process innovations lead 
to new experience curves in the production of products and can also lead to a decline in 
value of the executed investments. Furthermore, a strong focus on cost structure includes 
the risk that product renewals might not be executed in time. In addition, the risk that cost 
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advantages might be lost if there are disproportionate increases of costs in the production 
process.61 
 
 
4.1.3 Concentration strategies (focus strategies) 
 
As mentioned above the concentration strategies can be distinguished between 
differentiation focus strategy and cost focus strategy. While the differentiation focus 
strategy is related to a specific product differentiation, the cost focus strategy has the aim 
to generate cost advantages against competitors. 
Although there are parallels to the recent statements on cost leadership and differentiation 
strategy both concentration strategies are based on a geographic, demographic and / or 
socio-demographic segmentation of an industry, a submarket and / or a market niche. To 
gain a competitive advantage it is necessary to align the company to a specific market 
sector and not to an industrywide market (total sector). Due to this alignment of the 
strategy the company can serve the requirements of a specific market segment 
significantly better than an industry-wide operating enterprise.  
A development of segment-specific concentration strategies will only be possible if market 
needs are present that have not been satisfied enough yet. Due to the lower requirements 
related to resource equipment of a company compared to an industry-wide orientation the 
segment-specific focus is especially interesting for smaller company.62 
 
 
4.2 Outpacing strategy – a dynamic model of Gilbert and Strebel 
 
In order to determine the market dynamic and specific situations, the competitor strategies 
have to be flexible. Originally Porter`s strategy did not take into account the dynamic 
aspect of the strategy. For the first time this aspect has been taken into account by Gilbert 
and Strebel with the approach of the “Outpacing Strategies” in 1985. 
 
4.2.1 Definitions and backgrounds 
 
Gilbert and Strebel saw the two following basic competitive strategic dimensions similarly 
to Porter: 
 Perceived product value 
 Process cost 
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Perceived product value and process costs 
The expectation of benefits that a customer combines with a product (or service) are 
understood as perceived product value. The process costs include all investments which 
are necessary for development, production, marketing and delivery of a product. Gilbert 
and Strebel justify their decision as follows:  
On one side the profit potential of a company is represented through the gap between 
process costs and perceived product value, and on the other side since almost all 
companies identify these two dimensions with respect to the decision between cost 
leadership and differentiation. The difference to Porter is that they are not seen as 
contrary but complementary dimensions. It is vitally important to be the first to achieve a 
position of low costs and high perceived product value. 
Based on Gilbert and Strebel the “Outpacing Strategy” is the ability of a company to 
change based on the given/actual competition the focus between product value and 
process costs. By this, an essential advantage against the competition is reachable. Of 
highest importance is the time of the strategic shift. This remains valid especially 
regarding the background of the branch (industry) development.63 
 
 
4.2.2 Branch development 
 
For a comprehensive analysis of the industry development, Gilbert and Strebel have 
analysed data from 65 different consulting projects of IMEDE (International Management 
Institute). Related to the examined projects between the years 1979 and 1984 it was 
found that the various economic sectors have gone through a similar development. 
According to Gilbert and Strebel the competition in new industries is embossed in the 
beginning fundamentally through innovations. At the time of the industry development, 
many providers plan to increase the perceived product value. Therefore they are focusing 
their efforts on their own further technological developments. For example, in the early 
1980s, hundreds of companies in the computer industry competed for superiority in the 
PC market. Within that time period almost every vendor developed its own technology. 
Companies like IBM, Apple or Commodore had all different and incompatible PC’s. The 
innovation rate decreases with the time and some product characteristics / features that 
are becoming standard within a market. Such a process is also driven by companies, for 
example, in case of strategic alliances (see chapter no. 2.3). In such cases the product 
needs become clearly defined by the definition of a standard. This makes it possible for 
following companies with a low-price policy to accelerate their market entry. This 
beginning phase of the industry development is now characterised through hard price 
competition, cost orientation and high market growth. The providers that do not withstand 
the price pressure or their products are not in line with the standard are forced to leave the 
market. When the market growth with further development subsides, the power relations 
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become stable. After the phase of cost orientation there is a change back to 
differentiation. Finally standardisation and revitalisation have a central importance within 
the evolution of an industry.64 
 
 
4.2.3 Strategic alternatives 
 
According to Gilbert and Strebel, it is obvious to follow the preference strategy for new 
products and service from the beginning. This is already reasoned that due to the fact of 
the novelty (of a product or service), a high benefit is mediated. At a later time of the 
competition a standard will be achieved on which the products of the competitors have to 
orientate. If a company succeeds to codetermine this standard, then it wins a temporary 
lead to realise cost reductions. The price competition which starts later can only be 
challenged effectively through targeted cost reduction.  
The successors have to especially differ by lower costs and prices, and are forced to 
pursue a cost leadership. An additional competitive advantage will then be achieved by a 
differentiation in offer, which gradually begins. The offer differentiation is for a long-term 
existence in the market, and also for a position of simultaneous differentiation and cost 
leadership inevitable. The explained scenario can be seen also graphically in the following 
diagram-no. 24.65 
                 
                                        Figure 24: Visualisation of the outpacing strategy 
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There are two main possibilities to implement an outpacing strategy:  
 Until a standard has been established in the market, a differentiation strategy has 
to be pursued. After that, the aiming of cost leadership takes place in which the 
differentiation advantages should preferably not be given up. The cost leadership 
is especially important for the survival of the imminent price competition. 
 To generate enough capital in order to be able to invest afterwards in product 
improvements, a policy of low cost is important for a later market follower. Based 
on lower costs, the perceived product value shall be increased afterwards. 
If the goal is reached, the company must try again by lowering costs or higher product 
benefits to gain an advantage, because the process starts again. 
 
According to Gilbert and Strebel, to implement an outpacing strategy the following 
assumptions are essential: 
 A detailed knowledge of the industry, and the ability to anticipate turning points in 
the development of the industry. 
 A precise form of the original strategy which is based on costs or competitive 
advantages concerning the perceived product value. 
 To reinvest the generated profits for the change in strategy in the necessary 
resources in order to be able to act more quickly than the competitors. 
 
If the theoretical perceptions described are converted into practice, some issues 
need to be considered: 
 It should be noted that not each mixture of cost leadership and differentiation is a 
outpacing strategy. The characteristics of an outpacing strategy is that they have a 
unique focus on product or process, and that additionally gained competitive 
advantages on one dimension cannot be “bought” by the loss of others. An 
example here for is that qualitative improvements can be achieved without 
compromising the efficiency of the processes. 
 Furthermore the timing of the shift in strategy is very important. This is subjective, 
and a clear determination of the right time is not possible. In other words, a change 
of strategy is always subject to a certain risk. However, it is clear that after the 
standardisation-oriented production, mass-oriented production must be initiated 
and in the mature phase of the product life cycle, a revitalisation is imminent.  
 Implementing an outpacing strategy is connected with difficulties as the 
requirements to the organisation of a differentiated company are often 
incompatible with those of a cost leader. According to Gilbert and Strebel, despite 
of this fact, there are companies which succeed to overcome these difficulties.66 
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5 The use of the competitor strategies in the practice 
 
 Case studies/examples of airlines and expert interviews with airlines 
 
5.1 Lufthansa – the traditional airline (including Germanwings, 
Eurowings) 
 
5.1.1 Company profile and strategy 
 
History, business activities, organisation and strategy of Lufthansa 
 
History and business activities 
“Lufthansa was founded in Berlin in 1926 as a consolidated German airline. Its main aims 
were to develop safety of flying and open intercontinental routes. Lufthansa co-founded 
Iberia (Spain), Syndicato Condor (Brazil) and Eurasia Aviation Corp. (China) and held a 
stake in Deruluft, a German-Russian venture. In 1939 Lufthansa was one of the biggest 
airlines of that time, serving an extensive intra-European network and routes to South-
America, to the Near and Far East. Its fleet counted about 150 aircraft. A reduced route 
network was maintained during the war until 1945. After WW II the company became 
liquidated. 
In 1953 “Luftag“ was founded in Cologne, later renamed “Lufthansa“. This new German 
airline began operations in 1955, primarily with propeller aircraft, since 1960 with jets. 
Over the years a world-wide route network was growing. Today Lufthansa is one of the 
biggest international carriers. The Lufthansa home base is Frankfurt, the technical base 
Hamburg.”67 
The global aviation company consists of the following five business segments (2014) 
which have a leading position in their respective markets: Passenger Airline Group, 
Logistics, MRO, Catering and IT Services. 540 subsidiaries and associated companies 
belong to the overall group. 
Passenger Airline Group is the biggest operating unit within the group. Lufthansa 
Passenger Airlines, Austrian Airlines and SWISS are serving the worldwide market as 
network carriers while Germanwings offers point-to-point flights in Europe. Germanwings 
is the low cost carrier of the group and belongs 100% to Lufthansa. Furthermore 
Lufthansa has investments in the German-Turkish charter airline SunExpress and in the 
network carrier Brussels Airlines. Lufthansa Cargo is the freight airline of the business 
segment Logistics and is one of the world-wide leading providers regarding standard, 
express and special cargo. The other segments like Catering, MRO and IT Services offer 
a wide range of services for internal purposes but also to external customers. For 
                                                          
67
 ref. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Information Material, Department Planning and Operations,  
    FRA CI/P, e-mail 23.09.2015 
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example, Lufthansa Technik is the world-wide leading company which provides 
maintenance, repair and overhaul services for aircrafts (civil aviation). LSG Sky Chefs 
group is part of the catering segment and is also the market leading airline catering 
company in the world. Lufthansa Systems (until 2014) is an important provider of IT 
services to airline sector.68 
The sales of the company amounted in the last business year 2014 €30.0 bn with 119,000 
employees world-wide. 
 
Organisation of Lufthansa 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG is the mother company as well the biggest operating company of 
the overall Lufthansa Group. The business segment “Lufthansa Passenger Airlines” also 
belongs to this legal entity. The other business segments mentioned above (for example, 
Lufthansa Technik, Lufthansa Cargo, LSG Sky Chefs, etc.) are separate enterprises with 
their own profit and loss responsibility. The executive board of Deutsche Lufthansa AG is 
responsible for the overall strategy and managing of the enterprise and the supervisory 
board advises, appoints and supervises the executive board.69  
The chart no. 25 shows the current organisation and responsible persons for the 
respective functions:70 
 
Figure 25: Deutsche Lufthansa AG - overview current organisation (organisational chart) 
 
Strategy 
Within the latest reorganisation and changes in the executive board (new responsibilities) 
the company has adjusted its global strategy. The following main pillars of Lufthansa´s 
strategy are: 
                                                          
68
 ref. http://www.lufthansagroup.com/en/company.html, 21.09.2015 
69
  ref. http://www.lufthansagroup.com/en/company/company.html, 21.09.2015 
70
 ref. http://investor-relations.lufthansagroup.com/en/fakten-zum-
unternehmen/konzernstruktur.html, 21.09.2015 
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Lufthansa 
- main pillars of the global strategy - 
 
 
“Increase company value” 
 
“Profitable growth and 
active role in shaping the 
aviation industry” 
 
 
“Continuously increase 
customer satisfaction” 
71
 
Figure 26: Lufthansa – main pillars of the global strategy  
 
“The Lufthansa Group’s objective is to be the first choice for customers, employees, 
shareholders and partners.” 
The initiative “7to1 – Our Way Forward”: In order to achieve the above mentioned goals 
seven action fields have been defined and respective strategic steps implemented. The 
key success factors are: market position, age of the aircraft fleet and financial stability. 
These are all considered within the strategic steps of the initiative. “The seven areas of 
action” are the following: 
“7to1 – Initiative” of Lufthansa 
- the seven areas of action - 
 
“Customer 
centricity 
and quality 
focus” 
 
 
“New 
concepts 
for growth” 
 
“Innovation 
and 
digitalisa-
tion” 
 
“Effective 
and lean 
organisa-
tion” 
 
“Culture 
and lead-
ership” 
 
“Value-
based 
steering” 
 
“Constantly 
improving 
efficiency” 
 
Figure 27: Lufthansa - "7to1 – initiative, the seven areas of action” 
 
““7to1 – Our Way Forward” will set the Lufthansa Group up for the challenges of the 
future” and “the future development of the Lufthansa Group is determined by the pillars of 
the company strategy, to increase company value, generate profitable growth, play an 
active role in shaping the aviation industry and to achieve ever higher levels of customer 
satisfaction.” 
The combination of the operating segments of Lufthansa makes the company unique in 
the aviation sector.  Core business of the Lufthansa Group is still the network airlines 
segment but it has to be mentioned that the other companies outside the network airlines 
segment will continue to increase their sales and market share and as well their earnings. 
In regard to this it can be mentioned the service companies have a strong market position 
and remain a strategic competitive advantage for Lufthansa. “Their strong market position 
provides a natural hedge against the pressures exerted on the network and point-to-point 
airlines by the growth of their competitors.” 
                                                          
71
 ref. http://investor-relations.lufthansagroup.com/en/fakten-zum-unternehmen/group-   
strategy.html, 21.09.2015 
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The new Eurowings (from October 2015 onwards) will be related to the low-cost market 
segment and will offer flights within Europe (short-haul routes) but also to destinations 
outside of Europe (long-haul leisure travel routes), e.g. to South East Asia or Middle East.        
The following graphic summarises the previous mentioned descriptions regarding the 
strategy.72  
           
                                   Figure 28: Lufthansa: Detailed overview “7-to1 initiative” 
 
Descriptions and examples of measures related to the action fields of the “7to1-
Initiative”: 
 
01 - Customer centricity and quality focus: 
“On behalf of our customers, we are reaching for the stars on board and on the ground.” 
On more than 100 long-haul aircrafts the new first and business class is introduced which 
means that the entire long-haul fleet will have “fully flat beds” in business class. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the premium economy class starts as well at 
Lufthansa Passenger Airlines. All quality initiatives of all airlines of the group make a good 
progress.  
 
02 - New concepts for growth: 
“We are focused on the continuous profitable development of our Group and our 
companies.” 
As planned, the company transfers the connections outside of the Munich and Frankfurt 
hubs to Germanwings. The creation of the new Eurowings is based on a strategic decision 
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 ref. http://investor-relations.lufthansagroup.com/en/fakten-zum-unternehmen/group-strategy.html, 
21.09.2015 
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in order to further develop and expand this business in a systematic way. For the loyalty / 
frequent flyer program “Miles & More” an own legal entity has been founded which 
ensures the follow up of further growth potential.  
 
03 – Innovation and digitalisation: 
“With new solutions and business models, we are making the Company viable for the 
future, both internally and externally.” 
Lufthansa supports measures concerning innovation launching of an innovation fund 
which supports new solutions and technologies and the establishment of an innovation 
hub (Berlin), in order to intensify links with so called start-up companies (external 
partners).  
 
04 – Effective and lean organisation: 
“We are managing actively and lean our diverse group of companies.” 
Programs to optimise administrative areas by ensuring the continuation of the same and 
high quality process are making progress, and the business segments are getting leaner. 
The processes are now more standardised, efficient and cost effective. 
 
05 – Culture and leadership: 
“Motivation and passion for aviation are what sets us apart.” 
New developed unique leadership principles (“Driving Business, Leading Change, 
Creating Spirit, Fostering Talent and Mastering Complexity”) to manage staff and areas 
are used by the managers of Lufthansa across all companies of the group. This enables 
quicker decision-making. 
 
06 – Value-based steering: 
“With the right choice of financial performance indicators, we are making sure that our 
financial resources are allocated in the best way.” 
The implementation of more transparent key performance indicators (EACC and EBIT) 
reduces the complexity of the internal and as well external reporting system.  
 
07 – Constantly improving efficiency: 
“A permanent focus on developing and implementing earning improvement potentials is a 
continuous management task for us.” 
Initiatives like the “SCORE program” include the implementation of a lot of projects which 
support the stabilisation of earnings. In addition there are further measures ongoing in 
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order to improve earnings, for example, an agreement to outsource the IT Infrastructure 
unit of the IT Services.73 
 
 
5.1.2 Expert interview with Lufthansa 
 
Within this Master Thesis I contacted the headquarters of Lufthansa in Frankfurt, 
Germany in order to ask if the company is willing to do an expert meeting concerning my 
final work. I am very thankful that Lufthansa agreed to my inquiry and so I was able to 
hold the interview with them. 
The expert interview took place with Mr. Tobias Bunzel (Strategy Department of Lufthansa 
in Frankfurt/Main) via phone on 21. August 2015 in the time period from 10:30 am to 
11:50 am. In the following I will give a summary of the questions and the answers of the 
interview. The original meeting minutes (in German) you will find in the appendix no. 1.  
 
  
                                                          
73
 ref. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Annual Report, 2014, pp.5,6,7,11 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Lufthansa Group. 
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Summary of the expert interview with Lufthansa 
As a summary regarding the gained information out of the interview with Mr. Bunzel can 
be said that the business activities of low cost carriers have had a strong influence on the 
business of the traditional airline Lufthansa and these influences are still going on. This 
trend is also confirmed in the theory by various authors, see theoretical part of the work 
before. 
Lufthansa had to reorganise the point-to-point traffic in Europe, which the company has 
done with Germanwings within the last few years. From October 2015 the new Eurowings 
will take over this direct traffic in Europe. But also long-haul flights to tourist destinations 
will be operated by Eurowings. As an outlook it can be mentioned that long-haul flights are 
                                                          
74
 ref. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Expert Interview, Mr. Bunzel, Strategy Department FRA CE,  
   via phone 21.08.2015 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Lufthansa Group. 
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getting also more interesting to low cost carriers due to new aircrafts like the Boeing B787. 
This trend has to be observed carefully by the traditional airlines from my point of view. 
With regard to the strategies it can be said that Lufthansa followed a strategic approach 
based on Porter (see chapter no. 4.1) until the liberalisation of the European Single 
Market in 1993. Until that time the company has lived a strategy of quality leadership.  
After the European liberalisation and the start of the competition from the low cost 
carriers, the cost aspect has become more and more important for Lufthansa. From my 
perspective it can be seen that Lufthansa follows the dynamic approach (outpacing) of 
Gilbert and Strebel (see chapter no. 4.2). Lufthansa offered also cheap flights within 
Europe out of respective airports like Hamburg (beginning of the new century), and 
adjusted the cost structures, for example, creation of business units, increase of 
transparency of internal functions. (own knowledge M. Widmann) 
Lufthansa lives the outpacing strategy which can be seen with the implementation of 
measures to improve the position of the unit costs and the creation of the low cost airline 
Germanwings. A further example of this is the current development of the second brand 
Eurowings, however the cost adjustments do not mean that Lufthansa follows the target of 
cost leadership as Lufthansa will remain a premium brand. For this the company 
implemented constant measures also and a current example is the mentioned “5Star 
Initiative” and Lufthansa Private Jets some years ago.   
 
5.2 Vueling – a representative of the low cost carriers (an airline of 
the IAG Group) 
 
5.2.1 Company profile and strategy 
 
History, business activities, organisation and strategy 
Vueling belongs to the IAG Group (International Airlines Group) which is one of the largest 
airline groups in the world, which was formed in 2011. The headquarters of the company 
is located in London, UK. The following airlines belong to the group: Aer Lingus, British 
Airways, Iberia and Vueling. IAG operates with 523 aircrafts and the number of 
passengers amounts to 96.9 million every year. Within Europe IAG is the third biggest 
airline company (related to revenue). 
IAG is a Spanish registered company. The shares are traded on the Spanish and London 
Exchanges.75 
 
The history of Vueling 
Vueling was founded in May 2004. On 16. May 2004 Vueling`s website was completed 
which meant the start of the operation of the airline. On 1st July 2004, the first flight took 
place from Barcelona to Ibiza with an Airbus A320. Vueling start to operate with two 
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aircraft. The number of passengers reached in 2004 was 400,000 and the airline offered 
flights to 10 countries (and to 10 cities) within 15 routes and one operational base. 
One year later the airline operated flights to 15 cities in 6 countries within 26 routes, 2 
operational bases and 8 planes. The growth of the airline regarding planes, flight routes 
and number of passengers increased significantly within the last couple of years. Ten 
years later, in 2014, the number of aircrafts has reached 88 planes. Vueling carried 17.2 
million passengers in 2014 and operated on 301 routes to 131 cities in 38 countries with 
21 operational bases.76 The number of total employees per 31st December 2014 
amounted 2,390 with a net turnover of 1,696,781 thousand EUR. The following chart no. 
29 gives an overview about the number of employees per gender and category.77 
        
Figure 29: Vueling - overview employees per categories (state: 31.12.2014) 
 
Strategic milestones of Vueling 
 
2006:  
Frequent Flyer Program “Punto”: Vueling implemented its “Punto Programme” which is an 
air points collecting system without a card (100% online). Today 695,000 customers are 
using this benefit programme.  
In November 2006 Vueling became part of the stock exchange as the first “new 
generation” airline. This time on the floor ended with the integration into the IAG group in 
2013. 
2008:  
Launch of travel agency sales: The sales of flight tickets also via travel agencies started. 
Currently Vueling works in partnership with e.g. Amadeus, Sabre, Galileo and Worldsplan.  
Furthermore Vueling was the first airline to launch the possibility of buying flight tickets via 
mobile phones in 2008. 
2009:  
A next significant step in the history of the airline was the merger with Click Air. With this 
merger, an airline with 45 planes, 300 daily flights and 112 routes was formed.  
Furthermore the code-share agreement with Iberia and the option of the mobile boarding 
started in 2009. 
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 ref. http://www.vueling.com/en/we-are-vueling/us/infographic10, 30.09.2015 
77
 ref. Vueling Airlines S.A., Annual Report, 2014, pp.3+59 
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2010: 
Vueling had 50 planes based at the Airport of Barcelona El Prat (BCN). The airline offered 
130 direct flight destinations and also over 11,000 connecting flights. 
2012:  
The airline was awarded by the certification of the IATA Operational Safety Audit 
Programm (IOASA). This audit is based on approximately 1,000 requirements and 
practices regarding operational safety.  
Within the year 2012 the new “Excellence fare” was created, which enables customers to 
sit in the first row. These seats have an special space and ensure also an empty middle 
seat. In addition access to VIP-Lounges and priority boarding, priority check-in as well 
flexibility of last minute changes are granted with this exclusive booking class.  
Another historic milestone was that Vueling reached 50 million passengers in June 2012. 
2013: 
Vueling joined the International Airlines Group (IAG). This airline group is also the mother 
company of British Airways and Iberia. 
2014: 
Vueling implemented its second hub at the airport of Rome Fiumicino. This enables 
Vueling to follow the expansion in Europe but also in Middle East and Africa. Vueling 
offered 40 direct flights from Rome and approximately 850 flight combinations. This hub 
enables the operation of domestic flights within Italy and also to other destinations outside 
of Italy. Besides Rome Fiumicino the airports of Catania, Palermo, Florence, Turin and 
Genova became the operational basis for some planes in Italy.  
An additional strategic milestone was in 2014 when the code-share agreement was 
signed with British Airways. The airlines jointly operate domestic flights in Italy and Spain 
and also international ones. The AVIOS miles system became able to be used by the 
customers as well. 
New Premium Customer Programme: The implementation of this programme in 2014 
targets to acknowledge the loyalty of the frequent flyers of Vueling. The preconditions to 
become a Premium Customer are to fly 40 times within a time period of 12 months. A 
Premium Customer has to be member either of the “Punto” or the “Iberia Plus” frequent 
traveller programmes. A “Premium Customer” has benefits like priority boarding, fast track 
within security controls and faster response regarding incidents. 
Other convenient services which Vueling implemented in the last year were: change of 
booked flights via mobile or webpage to previous ones which depart on the same day 
(free of charge) and the offer of high-speed Wi-Fi connection.78 
 
The “DNA” of Vueling 
“We're an airline with friendly people and the conviction that there's always room for 
improvement. For us, flying is a true pleasure and we're aware that paying less doesn't 
mean enjoying less services or comfort. 
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We like to define our DNA by way of the following principles: 
Efficiency 
Efficiency is what drives us. At Vueling, we regard efficiency as the be-all and end-all. 
Focusing on doing what is truly important for our customers, doing it always, doing it 
better and accomplishing it with less resources is our driving force. Always, better and 
with less. 
Nonconformism 
Nonconformism is what sets us apart. We like to think that there's always room for 
improvement and that we have something to achieve. And why not? It's the question that 
makes us fly. 
Friendliness 
Friendliness is our philosophy. We strive to get closer to our customers by way of 
products that are both affordable and suitable for them. We're convinced that nothing 
enhances a relationship more than an open, respectful and friendly attitude. Without 
obstacles, without barriers, with respect. 
With our feet on the ground 
Keeping our feet on the ground is also part of our character, as important to us as giving 
wings to our rebellious side. Being realistic from the outset is the only way we know to be 
different, viable and competitive. We're realistic, because we want to go further.”79 
 
 
5.2.2 Expert interview with Vueling 
 
I also contacted the headquarters (Human Resources Department) of Vueling in 
Barcelona, Spain in order to ask if the company is willing to do an expert meeting 
concerning my final work. However, the company did not answer directly to my inquiry. As 
I know a First Officer of Vueling I used this contact. I am very thankful that this contact 
person hold the interview with me.  
The expert interview with Vueling has been done with a First Officer of Vueling Airlines. 
The interview took place in person via phone on 29. September 2015 (time period: 7:45 
pm - 9:15 pm). The original meeting minutes (in English) you will find in the appendix no. 
2. The answers from the interview are listed as below: 
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Summary of the expert interview with Vueling 
As a summary of the expert interview and the research I have done regarding Vueling it 
can be said that Vueling originally started like a typical low cost carrier back in 2004. The 
company expanded its business constantly within the last few years and today Vueling is 
a very important airline for Spain and also in the European aviation sector. Internally the 
airline acts like a low cost carrier. However, the airline aims to build up a quality image 
externally which follows a traditional airline. During the last years the airline offered more 
and more additional services which are not common for a typical low cost carrier model. 
The chance for customers to book special seats with more space, access to VIP-Lounges, 
additional onboard services and connecting flights are typical differentiation aspects for 
example. When we compare this development to the explained strategy models (chapter 
no. 4) Vueling now follows also the so called outpacing strategy based on Gilbert and 
Strebel. The airline entered into the business with a focus on cost orientation which the 
company still follows. However, at the time Vueling implemented more quality aspects by 
keeping the costs in focus. The latest significant strategic milestone was that Vueling 
became as a “high-quality low cost airline” an official member of the IATA organisation. 
This confirms that the company targets on the usage of the outpacing strategy. 
 
 
5.3 Air Berlin (short additional example) 
 
Within this Master Thesis I also planned to make an expert interview with the airline Air 
Berlin. I contacted the headquarters of the company in Berlin, Germany (Strategy 
Department). Unfortunately I did not receive a response from the airline. However, I will 
give a statement concerning this airline as well from my own point of view and the 
theoretical research which I have done. The questionnaire which I have developed within 
the work concerning Air Berlin can be seen in the appendix no. 3. 
As mentioned in chapter no. 3.4.1 Air Berlin developed within the last few years from a 
low cost carrier to a full-service airline (how they define them by themselves today) but 
they currently operate as well as low cost carrier, charter airline and a full-service airline.81 
This company is a further example which shows the airline is following an outpacing 
strategy (see chapter no. 4.2) according to Gilbert and Strebel. Starting originally as a 
charter airline, the company adjusted its offers more to match a traditional airline. They 
implemented hubs (e.g. Palma de Mallorca) and started with the single sale of tickets. “In 
December 2011 Air Berlin and Etihad Airways established a strategic partnership, and in 
the spring of 2012 Air Berlin became a full member of the global airline alliance 
Oneworld.” 
From my point of view the airline neither follows a clear cost or differentiation strategy in 
line with Porter. The strategy of Air Berlin can be seen as well more like the outpacing 
                                                          
81
 ref. Bergmann, Fliegen – ein (Alb-)Traum?, 2015, pp.433-434 
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model as Air Berlin has clearly strategies in both directions (cost orientation and quality 
orientation).82 
 
 
 Expert interviews with stakeholders - handling companies / suppliers 
 
Expert interviews with handling companies 
In order to receive also a feedback about the current situation in the aviation sector I also 
did expert interviews with handling companies which are directly affected stakeholders. 
The focus of this Master Thesis are traditional airlines and low cost carriers. Therefore I 
do not mention in detail the strategies about the handling operators like I did it for 
Lufthansa and Vueling but some information about the strategy comes out of the 
interview.  
In the interviews with handling operators I wanted to know how the airline business has 
changed for them within the last years and how they see the further development. With 
this topic I contacted the two handling operators Swissport and Groundforce at Barcelona 
El Prat Airport (BCN). In the following I will mention the questions and answers from the 
interviews. The original meeting minutes (Swissport in Spanish and Groundforce in 
English) can be seen in the attachments no. 4 and 5. 
 
 
5.4 Swissport 
 
5.4.1 Company profile 
 
The company was founded in 1996. “Swissport International is the leading global airport 
and aviation service provider in terms of quality, reliability, safety, innovation and network 
coverage. Offering a comprehensive range of services, Swissport is able to provide an 
“all-inclusive” service package in addition to managing integrated collaboration models.” 
The products / business units of Swissport are as follows: 
 Ground Handling 
 Cargo Services 
 Executive Aviation 
 Fuelling Services 
 Aircraft Maintenance 
 Aviation Security 
 Travel Services 
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The following chart shows the various key figures of the business year 2014.83 
                
Figure 30: Swissport - facts and figures 2014 
 
 
5.4.2 Expert interview with Swissport 
 
The expert interview took place in with Mr. Josep Lluis Fargas (Station Manager of 
Swissport at Barcelona El Prat Airport, BCN). The questions have been answered from 
Mr. Josep Lluis Fargas directly via e-mail on 19. August 2015. The answers out of the 
interview are listed in the following. The original meeting minutes (in Spanish) you will find 
in the appendix no. 4.  
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5.5 Groundforce 
 
5.5.1 Company Profile 
 
“Globalia Handling is an independent business unit of Globalia Corporation that has 
become a leading ground handling services provider to the sector since its establishment 
in 2003. 
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The beginning of its activity dates back to the mid-nineties when AENA (via Iberhandling 
and Eurohandling) awarded the company handling services licenses. 
Currently Globalia Handling is an established Company in the market that provides 
Handling, Cargo and GSE management to more than 200 worldwide customers in 13 
airports of Spain and Morocco and at 14 cargo terminals in Spain, marketing its services 
through its brands Groundforce and Groundforce Cargo.” 
The number of active employees amounts to 3.500.85 
 
The main services which Grounforce offers are as follows:86 
              
Figure 31: Groundforce - overview main services 
 
5.5.2 Expert interview with Groundforce 
 
The expert interview took place in person with Mr. Oscar Caballero (Training Department 
of Groundforce) on 22. September 2015 between 01:15 pm to 02:15 pm. In the following I 
will give a summary out of the questions and the answers of the interview. The original 
meeting minutes (in Spanish) you will find in the appendix no. 5.  
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Summary out of the expert interviews with Swissport and Groundforce 
The interviews with Swissport and Groundforce confirm that the business activities of the 
low cost airlines also has a strong influence on the daily business of the handling 
companies. The handling companies have to adjust their strategies according to the 
market. As both interview partners confirmed, safety and punctuality are the two most 
important points which every handling company has to focus on. Furthermore the fact that 
both companies have always to continuously reduce costs in order to be competitive, 
show that this strategy can be seen as well as an approach according to Gilbert and 
Strebel (outpacing strategy). Originally the offer of quality services (e.g. cleaning, catering, 
etc.) was more in focus and now the hard price competition requires that the companies 
have to adjust their structures (costs, resources, etc.) according to the market needs (less 
services like e.g. cleaning, catering required). The handling companies are following this 
challenge even the high quality of safety and punctuality will be always in the focus. This 
fact confirms that they are using the outpacing strategy (see chapter 4.2). 
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 Surveys with stakeholders – flight passengers / customers 
 
Survey to determinate the opinion of users (flight passengers) respective the use of 
air transportation  
“A survey within the Master Thesis “Competitive Position Analysis of Airlines: Traditional 
Airlines and Low Cost Carriers – Market Development, Trends and Outlooks based on the 
European Market” in Aviation Management at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
(UAB)”. 
 
5.6 Background information of the surveys 
 
In order to obtain a customer view concerning the current market situation and also the 
necessary potentials which have to be improved in the future, I have done a survey with 
flight passengers between August and September 2015. I wanted to know which criteria 
are important for flight passengers when they take a flight, and how they evaluate the 
traditional airlines vs. low cost carriers. 
Originally I intended to do the surveys directly at the Airport of Barcelona el Prat (BCN) 
and to ask for permission I contacted AENA with an officially inquiry letter (dated 
31.07.2015). Unfortunately AENA was not able to grant me the permission to do the 
surveys directly within the airport (see e-mail answer from AENA dated 14.08.2015 in the 
appendix no. 6).  
Therefore I did the interviews with colleagues of Swissport (I have worked with them 
during the summer as a flight dispatcher) and with friends and family members. In addition 
to the paper version of the questionnaire an online version has been developed (via 
Google). The original questionnaires in English, Spanish and German, and also some 
screenshots of the online version I attached to the appendix no. 7. 
In total 78 people participated in the survey. From that number, 50 people filled out the 
written paper version and 28 persons replied online. 47.4% of the respondents were men 
and 52.6% women. More information concerning the sociodemographic data (e.g. age of 
the surveyed persons, nationality and education background) I will give under question 
number nine of the survey. 
In the following I will give a detailed overview about the results out of the survey to each 
question and also a conclusion at the end. 
 
5.7 Results out of the surveys 
 
1. How often did you fly within the past years and for which reasons are you using 
the plane? 
The respondents could choose between: not at all, 1-3 times, 4-6 times, and more than 7 
times. For utilisation of the air transportation modes the following answers were possible: 
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private, business, both or does not apply- in case the surveyed person did not use an 
aircraft within the last year. 
                          
Figure 32: Survey passengers: Number of utilisation of plane within the last year 
According to the chart no. 32 above, the majority of the people have used a plane 
between 1-3 times within the last year (37.2%). 26.9% have used the plane between 4-6 
times, and 20.5% more than 7 times within the last year. Only 15.4% did not take a plane 
within the last year.  
                         
Figure 33: Survey passengers: Purpose of utilisation a plane 
As the chart no. 33 shows, more than the half of the respondents used a plane for private 
purposes (leisure). 25% used a plane for private and business reasons, and only 2.6% 
only for business travels. 15% of the surveyed people gave the answer “does not apply” 
as they did not fly within the last year. 
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2. How important are the following points for you concerning a flight? 
With this question I wanted to know how important various aspects are for the customers. 
The criteria which the respondents had to evaluate where: onboard service, safety, age of 
the aircraft fleet, price, flight schedule (frequencies) and reputation of the airline. The 
people had to mark their opinion for each criteria on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 
10 (very important). The results of the survey were as follows: 
 
Onboard service 
 
Figure 34: Survey passengers: Evaluation importance criteria onboard service 
28% evaluated the criteria onboard service with an 8 as important and even for 24.4% of 
the respondents the onboard service is very important. For more than the 60% of the 
respondents onboard service is an important criteria. 
 
 
Safety 
 
Figure 35: Survey passengers: Evaluation importance criteria safety 
This result is more than clear. For 82.1% of the respondents safety is very important. 
Nobody evaluated this criteria with a 1 or 2 (not at all important). 
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Age of the aircraft fleet 
 
Figure 36: Survey passengers: Evaluation importance criteria age of the aircraft fleet 
Also the age of the aircraft fleet is an important aspect for the flight passengers. 28.2% 
evaluated this criteria with very important. In total 62.8 % evaluated this criteria in the 
scale of 8 to 10.  
 
Price 
 
Figure 37: Survey passengers: Evaluation importance criteria price 
For almost the half of the people (46.2%) the flight price is a very important aspect. On a 
rate from 8 to 10, 80.8% said that the flight price is important to very important. 
 
Flight schedule (frequencies) 
 
Figure 38: Survey passengers: Evaluation importance criteria flight schedule (freq.) 
Generally this criteria has been evaluated as important, but as the answers show the 
people evaluate this criteria according to business or private purpose often differently. 
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(see answers to open question no 2). In total 66.7 % rated this criteria between the marks 
8 to 10 as important to very important. 
 
Reputation of the airline 
 
Figure 39: Survey passengers: Evaluation importance criteria reputation of the airline 
10.3% of the surveyed people evaluate the importance of the reputation of the airline as 
neutral (mark 5). Another 10.3% are in the opinion that this criteria is not at all important or 
not important (rating between 1 and 4 on the scale). However, for 62.8% of all 
respondents the reputation of the airline is an important to very important aspect (see 
marks between 8 and 10). 
The background of the following open question was to receive a feedback if the above 
mentioned points are evaluated differently based on the purpose of the flight. 
“In case you use either private (leisure) or business purpose – how do you evaluate 
the above mentioned points? Same? If different, what are the relevant points?” 
The majority of the surveyed respondents do not make a difference if they travel for 
private or business, and evaluate the above mentioned points the same. In total 24 people 
(out of 37) gave this statement. In case the people evaluate the points differently, the most 
common answer was that the customers evaluate the criteria “flight schedule 
(frequencies)” as the most important aspect when it comes to business travels (8 times 
mentioned). Concerning private flights, price is very important for a flight passenger (7 
times mentioned). Further comments which have been mentioned are that safety is the 
most important point overall and in case of business travels, access to lounges, and less 
waiting times are required. It has to be mentioned that from 78 respondents 47.4% (37 
respondents) gave feedback and the rest did not make any comment (see chart no. 40). 
The detailed answers can be seen in the appendix no. 8. 
                                      
Figure 40: Survey passengers: Open question 2 - feedback 
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With the next question I wanted to hear how the flight passengers evaluate the 
same criteria in general respective the traditional airlines.  
 
3. How do you rate traditional airlines like Lufthansa, Iberia, Emirates, etc. 
regarding the following points? 
 
Good onboard service 
 
 
Figure 41: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation criteria onboard service 
Exactly 74.4% rated between 8 and 10, and are in the opinion that the traditional airlines 
offer a good onboard service. 11 persons (14.1%) say that this criteria is fulfilled 
completely from the traditional airlines (correct at all). 
 
High standard of safety 
As the answers under question number one show the safety criteria is the most important 
aspect for the flight passengers. 
 
Figure 42: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation criteria safety 
According to the answers given from the respondents 35.9% are the opinion that the 
traditional airlines fulfils the safety aspect completely (correct at all). 79.5% in total 
evaluated that criteria in the scale between 8 and 10. Only 3.9% are the opinion that the 
traditional airlines do not have a high standard of safety. 
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Young age of the aircraft fleet 
 
Figure 43: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation criteria age of the aircraft fleet 
The people evaluated this criteria mostly on the scale between 5 and 10. Half of the 
people evaluated between 8 and 10 and think that the traditional airlines are operating 
with new aircrafts. 
 
Good price/quality value 
 
Figure 44: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation criteria price/quality value 
Many people have a different opinion regarding the price/quality value of traditional 
airlines. The majority (19.2%) evaluated the fulfilment of this criteria with a 7. Almost half 
of the respondents have a neutral opinion as they evaluated this criteria from 5 to 7 on the 
scale. Anyhow, 33.3% of the participants see good price/quality value of the traditional 
airlines (rating 8 to 10 on the scale). 
 
Good flight schedule (frequencies) 
 
Figure 45: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation criteria flight schedule  (freq.) 
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25.6% of the flight passengers agree that the legacy carriers have good flight schedules 
and frequencies, and gave the mark 8. In total on a scale from 8 to 10, 57.6% are of the 
opinion that the flight times are good to very good. Not satisfied (on a mark on the scale 
between 1 and 4) represent 7.7% of the persons. 
 
Positive reputation of the airline 
 
Figure 46: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation criteria reputation of the airline 
The answers to this question are again clear. 67.9% of the people are the opinion that the 
traditional airlines have a positive reputation in general and rate them from 8 to 10. 
 
 
4. If you have already travelled with a traditional airline like Lufthansa, Iberia, 
Emirates, etc. – how satisfied have you been with the overall service?
 
Figure 47: Survey passengers: Traditional airlines - evaluation satisfaction overall service 
Interesting to see is that only 9% of the 78 interviewed persons are fully satisfied with the 
service which the traditional airlines offer to the customers. However, the majority of the 
participants of the survey is satisfied with the overall service of the traditional airlines and 
evaluated these criteria with 8 and 9 (in total 70.5%). 
 
The second part of the survey was related to the low cost carriers.  
5. When you think about airlines like Vueling, Ryanair, Easyjet, Norwegian, 
Germanwings, etc. – what do you have in your mind? 
To this question 84.6% (=66 persons) of the total respondents gave their feedback (see 
following chart no. 48).  
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Figure 48: Survey passengers: Open question 5 - feedback 
Most people (45 respondents / 68.2%) combine low “cost carriers” with cheap/good 
prices. But in addition to this, most of the people are in the opinion that these airlines offer 
less service (16 answers in this regard), and that extra charges for luggage, drinks and 
food etc. have to be paid (10 answers given). Furthermore some respondents are not sure 
if the safety aspects are fulfilled (7 answers), and that the flight schedules (times) are less 
convenient (4 times). Another interesting aspect is that companies cannot be compared 
directly with each other (Germanwings and Vueling cannot be compared with Ryanair for 
example) as they offer a different standard of quality according to the perception of 
participants. The detailed answers can be seen in the appendix no. 8. 
 
For number 6 I asked exactly the same questions as I did for the traditional airlines, in 
order to be able to make a comparison statement afterwards. 
6. How do you rate airlines like Vueling, Ryanair, Easyjet, Norwegian, Germanwings, 
etc. regarding the following points? 
 
Good onboard service 
 
Figure 49: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation criteria onboard service 
This result is completely different compared to the result of traditional airlines. The 
majority of people (82%) have the opinion that the onboard service of the low cost carriers 
is not satisfying (rate between 2 and 7 on the scale). 
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High standard of safety 
 
Figure 50: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation criteria safety 
Compared to the ratings which the respondents gave to the traditional airlines, people`s 
opinion on the safety fulfilment on low cost carriers is different. 14.1% of the respondents 
have the opinion that the low cost carriers have a high standard of safety compared to 
35.9% which rated a ten for the traditional airlines. In total 42.3% think that the safety 
standard of low cost carriers is good to very high (rating between 8 to 10 on the scale). 
This is a significant difference compared to the rating of traditional airlines in which 79.5% 
in total evaluated that criteria in the scale between 8 and 10. 
 
Young age of the aircraft fleet 
 
Figure 51: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation criteria age of aircraft fleet 
In total 35.9% have the opinion that the low cost carriers fly with almost new aircraft 
(rating 8 to 10). This shows that the flight passengers see here also a difference 
compared to traditional airlines as 50% gave the mark 8 to 10 to the traditional airlines. 
But the result shows also that approximately 33% of the people have a neutral opinion. 
This might also be based that some flight passengers are not able to evaluate this criteria 
really due to less background information available. This is also similar in the evaluation 
result for the traditional airlines where 25.6% of the surveyed people gave the mark 5 or 6. 
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Good price/quality value 
 
Figure 52: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation criteria price/quality value 
With regards to good price/quality value of the low cost carriers, 51.3% have the opinion 
that this is correct to correct at all (rating 8 to 10). The same opinion concerning the 
traditional airlines share 33.3% of the respondents. This result shows that the customers 
are more satisfied with the price/quality value of the low cost carriers. 
 
Good flight schedule (frequencies) 
 
Figure 53: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation criteria flight schedule (freq.) 
29.5% rated that the low cost carriers have good flight schedules / frequencies and rated 
8 to 10, while 48.6% do not think that the flight schedules are good, giving them a rating of 
4 to 6. 57% people rated the traditional airlines with good flight schedules, rating them 8 to 
10. 30.8% were not satisfied with the flight schedules of the low cost carriers (on a mark 
on the scale between 1 and 4), compared to a result of 7.7% with the traditional airlines.   
 
Positive reputation of the airline 
 
Figure 54: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation criteria reputation of the airline 
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Only 7.7% have the opinion that the low cost carriers have a positive reputation (correct at 
all). This is less than the half of the people compared to the opinion of traditional airlines 
(19.2%). In total 19.3% evaluated this criteria with 8, 9 or 10. This is a clear difference to 
the result of the traditional airlines where 67.9% rated from 8 to 10 that they have a 
positive reputation.  
 
7. If you have already travelled with an airline like Vueling, Ryanair, Easyjet, 
Norwegian, Germanwings, etc. – how satisfied have you been with the overall 
service? 
 
Figure 55: Survey passengers: Low cost carriers - evaluation satisfaction overall service 
In total 30.7% were satisfied to fully satisfied with the service when they used a low cost 
carrier, marking them 8 to 10. This is again more than 50% fewer people  who gave this 
evaluation of the traditional airlines which had a total of 70.5%. 
 
In the following open question I wanted to receive a feedback about the customer 
requirements when using a plane. The respondents had to mention necessary 
improvements which they see for the future. 
8. What would you expect from future flights? Are you satisfied like it is right now 
or is there a necessity to improve? If you see improvements, which? 
67.9% (53 persons) of the overall respondents of 78 persons gave their feedback 
concerning potential improvements of flying (see chart no. 56).  
                              
Figure 56: Survey passengers: Open question 8 - feedback 
The most frequent answer was that the service has to be improved in general (19 
responses). This includes not only food or drink on board, but also communication with 
the flight passengers. For example, in cases of delays or that the pilot communicates not 
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only within the “welcome-speech” at the beginning of the flight. Another aspect which is 
also related to service is the seat comfort the airlines offer. People want better seat 
comfort, and there were 7 people with this opinion. Participants also mentioned the 
necessity to adjust the pricing system further and that the traditional airlines should 
decrease their flight prices based on the opinion of some respondents. Other respondents 
have the opinion that the pricing system has to be more transparent. Price has been 
mentioned in total 11 times. Safety was mentioned 7 times and this has to be kept at the 
same level, or increased further. These answers show that some passengers might have 
doubt especially in case they are flying with low cost carriers. Other improvement 
potentials which people wish for are: less additional fees for luggage, seat reservations, 
credit card payments (6 times mentioned), a higher punctuality of flights (6 times 
mentioned), faster check-in/boarding times (5 times mentioned), more flight destinations 
(5 times mentioned), better flight frequencies (3 times mentioned) and better connection 
flights (3 times mentioned). All answers given to this question can be seen in the appendix 
no. 8. 
 
9. Sociodemographic data 
Sex: 
                     
Figure 57: Survey passengers: Sociodemographic data - sex 
From the 78 participants in the survey 37 were men (47.4%) and 41 women (52.6%). 
 
Nationality: 
                                             
Figure 58: Survey passengers: Sociodemographic data - nationality 
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65.4% of the respondents were Spaniards, followed by 16.7% being German. Other 
respondents were from other European countries but also from America (North, Central 
and South America). No respondents were classed as Asian. 
Year of birth: 
                                                
Figure 59: Survey passengers: Sociodemographic data - year of birth (age groups) 
The age of the surveyed people were very heterogeneous. The majority of the 
respondents have been between 31 and 40 years (44.9% ), followed by the age range 21 
to 30 years (20.5%) and people between 41 and 50 years (15.4%). 
The exact data concerning the age of the respondents can be seen in the following table: 
18-20 years 21-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51-60 years 61-70 years 71-80 years
Number of 
respondents 2 16 35 12 11 1 1
Percentage of
respondents (%) 2,6 20,5 44,9 15,4 14,1 1,3 1,3
 
 
Education: 
                       
Figure 60: Survey passengers: Sociodemographic data – education level 
Most of the respondents (73.1%) have a university degree or a higher education. Another 
25.6% have reached the secondary school and 1.3% the primary school. 
1974 
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This result given are because many of the respondents were friends, family and co-
workers. If AENA had given me permission to do this survey directly at the airport, the 
education background of the surveyed people might have been more heterogeneous as 
well. 
 
 
5.8 Summary of the surveys 
 
Figure 61: Survey passengers: Total summary criteria evaluated (GRP, TA, LCC) 
In the following I will give a summary of the overall survey with flight passengers: 
According to question number 2, 3 and 6 I developed the above chart no. 61 which shows 
a summary of the evaluation results. All marks given for each criteria have been added up 
and divided by the number of participants of the survey. The figures have been rounded 
after (for example 9.39 = 9 or 6.78 = 7).  
In the middle of the chart can be seen the results out of question number 2 “How 
important are the following points for you concerning a flight?” This means the GRP = 
General Requested Perception how the respondents evaluated the importance of each 
criteria in general. The left column of the graphic shows the results of how the people 
evaluated the traditional airlines (TA) for each criteria from their point of view. On the right 
column is the same summary for the low cost carriers (LCC). 
Based on the results, it can be pointed out that the respondents see potential for 
improvements in the price/quality value, flight schedule (frequencies) and age of the 
aircraft fleet (see red marked box). Neither the traditional airlines nor the low cost carriers 
fulfil these criteria according to the customers needs. Within the rating scale all these 
criteria have been evaluated with a 7 which means satisfying (an 8 or 9 is expected for 
these criteria from customer side). The criteria flight schedule (frequencies) on low cost 
carriers, have been evaluated with a 6. This means that both airline types (traditional and 
low cost) have to implement measures in order to improve these aspects. 
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When we look at the others criteria, we see that the traditional airlines fulfil the criteria of 
onboard service and reputation of the airline, exactly to the customer requirements. 
Respondents rated safety with a 9, which according to this survey the respondents also 
do not see as absolutely fulfilled from the traditional airlines (the traditional airlines 
received an overall rating of 8). The low cost carriers received a rating of 7 in terms of 
safety, and therefore this result is one mark less compared to the traditional airlines. 
A big gap between traditional airlines and low cost carriers show the results of the 
evaluation for the points “onboard service” and “reputation of the airline”. The low cost 
airlines received a mark of 5, while the traditional airlines received an overall mark of 8. 
The next gap between the two airline concepts is the “reputation of the airline”, and here 
the low cost carriers received a 6 compared to 8 for the traditional airlines. 
These results confirm the answers to the open questions number 2, 5 and 8. Especially 
the answers regarding question number 8 which shows that the respondents see the 
necessity to improve the offered service (mainly on the low cost carrier side). Examples 
given, besides the classical onboard service are more seat comfort and communication 
with the flight passengers, in cases of delays, and customer treatment in general. 
 
How satisfied are the passengers concerning the respective type of airline per age 
group? 
The following graphic includes the average results of the evaluations for the criteria which 
the passengers rated within question number 3 and number 6 [AE/AT (all criteria) = 
Average evaluation of all criteria per airline type]. All results per age group and airline type 
have been summed up and divided by the quantity of criteria. 
Furthermore the graphic shows how the respondents evaluated the traditional airlines and 
the low cost carrier overall in question number 4 and 7 [OE/AT= Overall evaluation per 
airline type (Q4 and Q7)].  
The detailed data base (table) of the following graphic can be seen in the appendix no. 9.  
TA LCC TA LCC TA LCC TA LCC TA LCC TA LCC TA LCC
Age: 18 - 20 Age: 21 - 30 Age: 31 - 40 Age:  41 - 50 Age: 51 -60 Age: 61 - 70 Age: 71 - 80
AE/AT (all criteria) 6 6 7 7 8 7 7 6 8 6 7 5 9 8
OE/AT 6 7 7 7 8 7 8 5 9 5 7 5 9 8
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Comparison evaluation by range of age per airline type
 
Figure 62: Survey passengers: Total summary comparison evaluation by age group per airline type 
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By analysing the results we can see some variations per age group between the 
traditional airlines and low cost carriers, but also in between the same airline type when it 
comes to the overall evaluation of an airline type (means average result of all criteria vs. 
overall evaluation per airline type). 
As mentioned above (question number 9) the participants can be divided into seven age 
groups. The youngest (18-20 years), and two oldest age groups (61-70 and 71-80 years) 
have been presented only by four persons in total and therefore the following comments 
are focused on the remaining age groups. 95% (74 persons) of the respondents belong to 
the four age groups between 21 and 60 years.  
 
Analysis per age group comparing traditional airlines (TA) vs. low cost carriers (LCC) 
The overall evaluation per airline type (OE/AT = red bars) differed per age group as 
follows: The group of 21-30 years (21% of 78 participants) does not see any differences 
between the two airline models. 7 was given in the overall evaluation. When we have a 
look on the age groups 31-60 (three groups, = 74% of 78 participants) we can see that 
these respondents evaluated the traditional airlines with a higher mark compared to low 
cost carriers. Especially the age group 51-60 (14% of participants) evaluated the 
traditional airlines 4 marks better than the low cost carriers. 
The average evaluation of all criteria per airline type (AE/AT = blue bars) show in the most 
cases similar or very close to OE/AT (red bars).  In the overall analysis by criteria the 
traditional airlines also receive better results. 
 
Analysis per age group related to each single airline type 
By analysing the single airline types within the four main age groups (21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 
51-60) we need to compare the red and blue bars to obtain the match percentage in 
between the overall evaluation per airline type (OE/AT), and the average evaluation of all 
criteria per airline type (AE/AT). 
TA: Concerning the groups 21-30 and 31-40 there are no differences between the 
evaluations of AE/AT compared to OE/AT. The differences can be seen in the age groups 
41-50 and 51-60. These age groups evaluated the traditional airlines on “OE/AT” with 8 to 
9 points, but compared to AE/AT they marked lower. With a total of 78 respondents, the 
match between these parameters is 71% (2/7: two variations within seven age groups). 
This means that the OE/AT for TA was in 71% of the cases similar to the AE/AT for all 
criteria. 
LCC: The age groups 21-30 and 31-40 did not evaluate the AE/AT different compared to 
OE/AT. For both age groups the results on the scale from 1 to 10 was 7. A difference can 
be seen in the age groups 41-50 and 51-60. These people evaluated the OE/AT of the 
LCC more negative compared to the AE/AT of the LCC (mark OE/AT for the low cost 
carriers is 5 in the scale from 1 to 10) while the mark AE/AT of the low cost carriers for 
both groups is 6. Based on this data, the match of the evaluations AE/AT vs. OE/AT is 
57% (3/7: three variations within the seven age groups). 
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From my point of view this result might be based on the fact that especially the “older” 
respondents have travelled more with traditional airlines in the past and appreciated their 
former service. Due to further unknown criteria (in addition to the criteria the respondents 
had to evaluate) these age groups might have additional criteria or experiences they take 
into account when it comes to the overall evaluation per airline type. The results confirm 
that these age groups are even less satisfied with the overall service of the low cost 
carriers compared the criteria I asked them to evaluate only. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Trends and outlook 
 
A trend which can be seen from the survey taken by passengers, shows that they want a 
better quality of service, but the flight price will always be a very important criteria for 
them. Differences can be seen in the requirements of the customers when it comes to 
private or business travel. Regarding business travel people have a higher focus on flight 
frequencies, and that they also want the seats to be more comfortable (especially when 
the flights are longer). The airlines have already reacted to these customer needs. Some 
airlines offer more additional services – some less. For example, Germanwings and 
Vueling now offer the possibility to book extra comfortable seats and additional services 
all the way up to VIP lounge access. Ryanair also has additional services in their portfolio 
for example, special seat reservation, however, less compared to Germanwings or 
Vueling. Offering additional services alongside the flight ticket has now become a further 
revenue generator for airlines. As we learnt in chapter number three, Ryanair generated 
24.8 % further revenue by selling additional services in 2013/2014.  The usage of an 
internet connection is a further service which customers have requested, and some 
airlines already offer Wi-Fi connections as a standard service now. The use of electronic 
devices during take-off and landing in flight mode is now permitted. In general the internet 
had and has a very strong influence on the overall airline business. Smart phones and 
tablets changed the booking procedure, check-in and boarding procedures, and further 
developments in this area will surely take place. The airlines have to adapt their offers and 
processes according to new technologies in order to be always up-to-date. It has to be 
mentioned that in the service sector, airlines are adjusting their flight prices with regard to 
customer needs (required services). Lufthansa as a traditional airline reduced the price of 
the basic tariff within Europe, but started to charge additional fee in case the flight 
passenger wants to check-in luggage with their lowest tariff. Air Berlin also followed that 
trend (own knowledge out of internet research). Concerning the flight prices, the 
customers want to have a higher transparency. This has been mentioned several times in 
the surveys. 
Further trends are that the low cost carriers will receive far fewer (or sometimes none at 
all) subventions when they are flying to regional airports (so called secondary airports). 
The use of regional airports has been a main part of the original business model of a low 
cost carrier. Due to less subventions and the fact that the customers have a tendency to 
want to fly to the main airports (has been confirmed also within the expert interview with 
Lufthansa and by the surveys with flight passengers) in future the growth of the air traffic 
will take place more within the main international airports as also low cost carriers like 
Ryanair will fly more to these airports. This means for traditional airlines like Lufthansa, 
even more competition in the future. In the interview with Lufthansa, the interviewee 
pointed out that furthermore the Gulf Carriers are now a strong competition to traditional 
airlines like Lufthansa – not only within long-haul traffic.  
As mentioned within the expert interview with Vueling, high speed trains have become an 
additional competitor to airlines also, especially within short-haul destinations. This 
competition also has to be taken into account. 
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Another trend which has been mentioned (within the expert interview with Lufthansa) is 
that new technologies / aircraft might enable some low cost carriers to fly longer 
distances, and that they might enter into the long-haul business also. Norwegian is an 
example of an airline already doing this.  
Due to the overall high competition the airlines have decreased the turnaround times and 
are asking for less ground handling services. When an average turnaround time in the 
past was approximately fifty minutes – today turnaround times of approximately thirty 
minutes are not uncommon. This trend has had a direct influence on handling companies 
and they are now under a lot of pressure to reduce service time and costs also (see 
results out of the expert interviews with Swissport and Groundforce). Furthermore, with 
these new reduced turnaround times, there is a potential for more flights to be delayed 
because the schedule (handling, flight preparations, boarding and disembarkment) is far 
tighter. 
Regarding the future outlook of Strategic Alliances, I learnt from the interview with 
Lufthansa that such alliances are well developed and quiet complex already. Joint 
ventures between airlines will therefore become a higher importance in future, with deeper 
collaborations between several airlines. Strategic alliances between low cost carriers and 
traditional airlines might not happen, as the low cost carriers do not normally fulfil the 
preconditions of membership. Furthermore the costs of a membership are quiet high, and 
the business model of a low cost carrier (normally no utilisation of hubs, only point-to-point 
traffic) does not require the advantages of a classical strategic alliance. Selective 
partnerships in the low cost segment will be more in focus than memberships in strategic 
alliances. Strategic alliances between low cost carriers are not seen at all as geographic 
supplements (benefits) do not exist (information out of expert interview with Lufthansa).  
 
 
6.2 Own recommendations to the future development of the airline 
business in Europe 
 
  
Hided part. Recommendations given from author side are related to e.g.: 
- Communication with PAX 
- Pricing 
- Product 
- Digitalisation 
- Supply Chain  
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6.3 Closing words  
 
Since the liberalisation of the aviation market, flying has changed. In Europe the change 
started in the 1990s with the full liberalisation of the European aviation sector. Since that 
time, the low cost carriers started their operation in Europe. The market share of the low 
cost carrier in Europe was 5% in 2000. Since that time their market share increased 
significantly and amounts today to approximately 30%. 
The cheaper flights offered by low cost carriers enabled more and more people the use of 
air transportation. As a very important conclusion of the work, it has to be mentioned that 
the traditional airlines and low cost carriers are getting more and more close to each 
other. A migration of the classical business models can be seen, which confirm the 
utilisation of the outpacing strategy in the practice (see theory of Gilbert/Strebel, chapter 
number 4.2). This means the airlines are not focusing anymore on either a clear quality or 
on a clear cost leadership strategy, according to the approach of Porter (chapter number 
4.1). When we summarise the results of the expert interviews with Lufthansa and Vueling, 
it can be pointed out that Lufthansa focuses its measures (since the liberalisation of the 
European aviation market and since a few years with Germanwings, and now with 
Eurowings) more on cost aspects, but without losing the original quality leadership 
strategy. Vueling as another example, uses after a successful utilisation of the cost 
leadership strategy now stronger the differentiation strategy. But also Vueling does not 
lose their original strategy regarding costs. Both airlines which have been investigated in 
the practical part of the work are an indication for the outpacing strategy.  
The traditional airlines which stand (originally) for premium quality airlines have to reduce 
their unit costs constantly in order to offer also cheaper flights to customers according to 
the market needs. The airlines always have to keep their cost structures under control, 
and offer at the same time “more quality”. Only economical airlines will survive the hard 
competition from my point of view. The airlines have been in the past and are still very 
confronted with collective bargainings on the employee side. In some cases the airlines 
have been able to sign agreements with the employees and in some cases there are still 
conflicts. Also the continuous adjustment of tariff agreements with employees is of highest 
importance (see expert interview Lufthansa).  In some cases the traditional airlines 
created their own low cost carrier in order to remain/be again competitive especially in the 
point-to-point traffic (short-haul flights). In case of creation of own low cost carriers by a 
traditional airline, often new tariff agreements with employees are used in order to achieve 
the necessary competitiveness, for example regarding salaries the airline has to pay. 
Furthermore the traditional airlines are operating more and more only with one type of 
aircraft within short-haul flights. Due to this the traditional airlines can also reduce staff 
costs as each pilot can fly each aircraft and each flight attendant can also work on each 
plane. Besides the reduction of employee costs, the utilisation of only one (two or few) 
type of aircrafts leads to further synergy effects when it comes to maintenance, for 
example. As we can learn from the statistics of the actual low cost carrier market in 
Europe (chapter number three), 90% of the flight routes are only operated by one low cost 
carrier. This means that the direct competition in regard to flight routes in Europe is still 
low, which some airlines might use as a potential to increase their business in the future 
as well. 
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In general the original low cost carriers nowadays offers more quality in form of additional 
services like the possibility of booking special seats, food and drinks on board, priority 
services regarding check-in procedures and so on. However, it has to be pointed out that 
not each low cost carrier can be compared with each other. Ryanair has to be seen still 
more like a typical low cost carrier like Vueling or Germanwings. Ryanair offers additional 
services, too but the airlines Vueling or Germanwings even more. Also the flight prices of 
Vueling and Germanwings are in average higher compared to Ryanair for example. Some 
respondents of the passenger survey made negative comments especially regarding to 
Ryanair (see appendix number 8). 
As the results of the survey with flight passengers show the people still differ between 
traditional airlines and low cost carriers and evaluate the traditional airlines in tendency 
better compared to the low cost carriers. Especially the older respondents can be 
mentioned in this regard.  
But as mentioned in chapter three, the migration of the business models within the last 
years has also led to the fact that it is more and more difficult to clearly define a low cost 
carrier (expect the real low cost carriers like Ryanair and Easyjet). The migration of the 
business models also leads to differences (problems) concerning the assignation of the 
respective data in statistics. Air Berlin is counted in some statistics as low cost carrier and 
in some not. Therefore in some years it might be the case that a differentiation between 
low cost carriers and traditional airlines will become of less importance or even not 
necessary anymore. 
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7 Appendix  
          
Appendix 1: Expert interview with Lufthansa, 21. August 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hided a part may contain confidential information of Lufthansa Group. 
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*part of Appendix 1* 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Lufthansa Group. 
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*part of Appendix 1* 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Lufthansa Group. 
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*part of Appendix 1* 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Lufthansa Group. 
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Appendix 2: Expert interview with Vueling, 29. September 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Vueling / IAG Group. 
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*part of Appendix 2* 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Vueling / IAG Group. 
 
  Page: 95/118
  
Appendix 3: Expert interview with Air Berlin (was planned / did not take place) 
 
 
Remark: Interview inquired dated 18. August 2015 but no answer received from the 
company. Below attachment shows the questionnaire which I have prepared concerning 
Air Berlin.  Also I have attached the original inquiry letter which I sent to Air Berlin. 
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Addition to Appendix 3: Confirmation Letter UAB to Airlines (Air Berlin) 
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Appendix 4: Expert interview with Swissport, 19. August 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Swissport. 
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*part of Appendix 4* 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Swissport. 
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Appendix 5: Expert interview with Groundforce, 22. September 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Groundforce. 
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*part of Appendix 5* 
Hided as part may contain confidential information of Groundforce. 
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Appendix 6: Questionnaires with flight passengers - inquiry to AENA regarding surveys at 
Barcelona El Prat Airport (BCN) 
Remark: Originally I intended to do the surveys directly at the Airport of Barcelona el Prat 
(BCN) and to ask for permission I contacted AENA. Unfortunately AENA was not able to 
grant me the permission to do the surveys directly within the airport. The original inquiry 
letter to AENA and the answer to it I attached in the following.  
 
Inquiry / Confirmation Letter sent to AENA: 
 
 
Answer from AENA: 
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Appendix 7: Survey with flight passengers - questionnaire 
 
A) English version 
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B) Spanish version 
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 7* 
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C) German version 
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 7* 
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D) Online version (English and Spanish):  
Screenshots questionnaire 
Remark: The following graphics are extracts (schematically only) of the overall Online 
version of the surveys with flight passengers. The Online version was created via Google 
Application. 
 
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 7* 
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 *further screenshots online questionnaire 
 
 
Example of the results / statistics (extract) … 
 
*part of Appendix 7* 
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Appendix 8: Survey with flight passengers – answers open questions no. 2, 5 and 8 
 
A) Open question no. 2: 
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B) Open question no. 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 8* 
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*part 2 regarding open question no. 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 8* 
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C) Open question no. 8:  
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 8* 
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*part 2 regarding open question no. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*part of Appendix 8* 
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Appendix 9: Detailed overview evaluation per age group concerning criteria per airline 
(average) and overall (per airline type) 
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ABSTRACT  /  EXTRACTO  /  RESUM 
 
ENG: The present study examines the European aviation market regarding the 
development of the past few years and the current situation. The focus of this work is 
traditional airlines and low cost carriers. Within the project expert interviews with airlines 
(Lufthansa and Vueling) and handling companies (Swissport and Groundforce) were 
executed in order to underpin the theoretical part of the work and to derive trends in the 
sector. A further component of the work was a survey with flight passengers. The target of 
this was to receive customer views concerning the actual situation and to represent 
customer needs. 
  
 
ESP: El presente estudio repasa el desarrollo del mercado europeo de la aviación desde 
los últimos años hasta la actualidad. Basa su enfoque en las compañías aéreas 
tradicionales y las de bajo coste. Fueron necesarias entrevistas a representantes de 
compañías aéreas (Lufthansa y Vueling) y empresas de handling (Swissport y 
Groundforce) con el fin de sustentar la parte teórica de la investigación y para obtener las 
tendencias en el sector de cara al futuro. Así mismo, fue necesario conocer a través de 
encuestas, la opinión de los pasajeros con el objetivo de determinar la situación actual 
vista por ellos y para conocer las necesidades del cliente. 
 
 
CAT: El present estudi repassa el desenvolupament del mercat europeu de l'aviació des 
dels últims anys fins a l'actualitat. Basa el seu enfocament en les companyies aèries 
tradicionals i les de baix cost. Van ser necessàries entrevistes a representants de 
companyies aèries (Lufthansa i Vueling) i empreses de handling (Swissport i 
Groundforce) amb la finalitat de sustentar la part teòrica de la recerca i per obtenir les 
tendències en el sector de cara al futur. Així mateix, va ser necessari conèixer a través 
d'enquestes, l'opinió dels passatgers amb l'objectiu de determinar la situació actual vista 
per ells i per conèixer les necessitats del client. 
 
 
 
 
